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Abstract 
People around the world are meeting in places that consist of little more than a 
touch of some hardware, a dash of electricity, and a pinch of code. As the Internet 
becomes increasingly incorporated into our lives the subject of online identity becomes 
increasingly relevant. How are we to conceive of ourselves as selves on the Internet? Is 
there anything unique or special about the way in which we relate to ourselves in 
cyberspace? 
Sherry Turkle answers this question affirmatively, arguing that the Internet is 
suggestive of a decentered theory of self which ought to make us reconsider our very 
notion of our identities. In chapter one, Turkle’s position is examined, and I argue that 
while her encompassing view on online identity presents some incredible insights, in the 
end it falls short because her argument draws a false conclusion. 
 In chapter two, Christine Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity is taken up as a 
means of addressing the weakness in Turkle’s theory and, at the same time, salvages the 
insights revealed in the first chapter.  
 With a theory of unified online identity established, in chapter three it is applied 
to both show its applicability to case studies and scenarios one may face as they traverse 
cyberspace, and to explain how it is we can understand our relation to our online selves in 
a deep sense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Computer users all across the world experience a phenomenon that is made 
possible by the Internet. This phenomenon is online identity and it is experienced in a 
variety of ways depending on what activity is undertaken in cyberspace.1 Whether one is 
checking their e-mail, participating in web forums, chatting with friends and family, 
exploring virtual worlds, or simply surfing around the World Wide Web, one has an 
online identity because one’s use of the computer-mediated technology forces one to self-
identify to other Internet users and, reflexively, to oneself.  It can be asked, however, 
whether this technology changes anything with respect to our conceptions of ourselves.  
I argue that while the Internet does not change our conception of self in any 
essential way, it can affect, expand, and alter the way in which we view ourselves. In this 
way, by not considering the self to be essentially or fundamentally changed, a theory of 
unified online identity is presented as an explanation of how cyberspace affects our 
notion of identity. The thesis is divided into three chapters, which are divided into various 
sections. 
Chapter one examines Sherry Turkle’s decentered theory of online identity, and is 
the source of opposition to my thesis. The goal of this chapter is to both present Turkle’s 
view, and highlight how online identity is special. Turkle’s theory starts by situating itself 
in the postmodern tradition, after which her positions on both the structure of the mind, 
and epistemology are provided. Turkle constructs a theory of online identity in which 
fragmentation of the self and disunity of experience are central ideas. For her, this is a 
desired outcome in as much as the online experience exemplifies those ideas. Turkle 
concludes that online identities are valuable insofar as they promote psychological health 
and well being. This chapter ends with the conclusion that, while Turkle raises many 
                                               
1 Dorian Wiszniewski and Richard Coyne, “Mask and Identity: The Hermeneutics of Self-
Construction in the Information Age,” Building Virtual Communities: Learning and Change in 
Cyberspace, Ed. Renninger et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) provide an in depth 
survey of the issue of online identity as it arises within the field of information technology. The 
overarching themes of education and architecture play a prominent role as they explore the subject. The 
span of their study begins in ancient times with Plato and Aristotle and ends with more contemporary 
theorists. 
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interesting points about online identity, and the usefulness of cyber-selves, she is wrong 
in claiming that the knowing self is a contradictory self. 
Chapter two appropriates Christine Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity as a 
means of explaining a theory of online identity that can keep the positive aspects of 
Turkle’s theory, and at the same time provide a description of the unified experience of 
lived experience. Korsgaard takes a phenomenological approach to the subject of 
practical identity to justify a Kantian ethic. While Korsgaard’s project is concerned with 
morality, the concept of identity she seeks to ground it in works well for a theory of 
online identity. By tracing the process from self-consciousness through to how we come 
to have a conception of what makes a human life worth living, an account of autonomy 
emerges as a concept that can unify the self, even in cyberspace. This chapter ends with 
some ideas about how a theory of practical identity could be applied to the subject of 
ethics in cyberspace. No ethical position, however, is taken regarding online ethics. The 
conclusion drawn from chapter two is that a theory of practical identity can explain the 
special features of online identity, and account for the objection leveled against Turkle in 
the previous chapter. 
With a theory of unified online identity established, chapter three puts it into use. 
The chapter begins by applying the theory of unified online identity to a famous cyber 
event that occurred in the early 1990s, where it was alleged that a rape had occurred in 
cyberspace. By examining this event through the lens of practical identity, a better 
understanding of how we can understand ourselves to be unified in cyberspace is made 
clearer. This chapter also uses a theory of practical identity to outline the various ways 
that we can understand our online selves. A theory of practical identity can explain, in a 
deep sense, the conditions from under which our online selves are much like our selves in 
everyday life, and can illuminate the circumstances under which our online selves are 
very much different than our selves outside of cyberspace. 
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1. A DECENTERED THEORY OF ONLINE IDENTITY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Sherry Turkle begins her book Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the 
Internet with the claim, “We come to see ourselves differently as we catch sight of our 
images in the mirror of the machine.”2 She argues that technologically mediated 
communication has changed the way we conceive of “our very identities.”3 While Turkle 
never explicitly gives a definition of identity - and her broad inter-disciplinary appeals do 
not allow her to be pinned down to one academic field - its meaning becomes clearer 
when her theory is examined as two related positions. The first position concerns the 
concept of the self as fragmented and non-autonomous. The fragmented self is, for Turkle, 
especially visible in cyberspace where one can, among other things, don a multiplicity of 
identities that can radically differ from each other and perhaps more importantly, differ 
from one’s RL self.4 The second position concerns the value our cyber identities have for 
increased self-knowledge. This capacity arises from the potential for new experiences 
brought about from multiple online identities, in which our RL self is largely invisible. 
For Turkle, understanding the value to be found in such explorations of the self is 
dependent upon an understanding of how we obtain knowledge. These two positions 
comprise a theory of online identity as the first position describes how we should 
understand the phenomenon of online identity, while the second position makes a 
normative claim about how this phenomenon is valuable. 
The two positions attributed to Turkle are brought to light through an example 
designed to highlight the specialness of online identity. Imagine that you enter a virtual 
world and encounter yourself. This statement can be interpreted in at least two ways. In 
one sense, you could actually meet an avatar that goes by your name and may even 
possess many of your physical attributes. To be sure, you are not actually meeting 
                                               
2 Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1995) 9. 
3 Turkle, Screen 9. 
4 RL stands for “real life.” RL is identified by its initials to make a distinction between the offline 
world and cyberspace in such a way that reality of the latter is not questioned. In other words, both RL and 
cyberspace are real and distinguishable. Meatspace, as opposed to cyberspace, is a cruder way of making 
the distinction. 
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yourself in this first kind of scenario but rather meeting someone, or something, 
masquerading as you. Turkle had this experience when she met a character named Dr. 
Sherry in a virtual community who was conducting interviews about the psychology of 
MUDs.5 It turned out that Dr. Sherry was a composite character designed by two students 
who themselves, like Turkle, were working on the subject of online identity.6 What is 
interesting about this example is that two agents were constructing one identity, a feat not 
easily replicated outside of cyberspace.7 Suppose now, that rather than meeting one 
avatar professing to be you, there are many. They all look and act like you but are 
controlled by a user, or users, other than yourself.  While it is unlikely that this would 
ever happen to those of us not sufficiently famous to warrant such flattery, the example 
does point to the fact that online “the one can be many and the many can be one.”8 The 
point is that the Internet provides special opportunities for identity, because we are forced 
to explain how it is that we self-identify with a multitude of diverse online selves not 
bound by the constraints of one’s RL body. 
The second sense in which you can encounter yourself online is more personal 
and does not involve others. Imagine you are tasked to design a home page. A home page 
is a personal web page constructed by an individual which, among other things, reflects 
                                               
5 MUD is an acronym for a “multi-user domain, dungeon, dimension, etc.” They are text based 
virtual communities, though not necessarily a game, in which people control avatars and interact with one 
another. The last letter in the acronym is often appropriated by groups who find another word that begins 
with the letter ‘d’ that better fits their vision. Furthermore, some text based virtual worlds drop the ‘d’ 
altogether. MOO, for example, stands for “multi-user object oriented,” MUX stands for “multi-user 
experience”, and MUSH refers to “multi-user shared habitat/hallucination.”  Since they are text based, all 
objects and actions are represented as words and phrases. Objects are created by assigning them 
descriptions. So, for example, if one wanted to create a ball, one would commonly type ‘@create ball,’ then 
‘@desc ball=the ball is round.’ If one were to then type ‘look at ball,’ the MUD program’s output would be 
‘the ball is round.’ If you wanted to then throw the ball, the command ‘@emote: Throw the ball,’ would 
produce the output ‘[your user name] throws the ball.’ With these simple tools as building blocks, complex 
worlds that house hundreds, possibly thousands, can be created. 
6 Turkle, Screen 16. 
7 It could be thought that co-authors working on a novel or script may collaboratively construct an 
identity. This process, however, does not capture the kind of agency involved in a virtual world where 
actions are attributable to avatars differently than they are to characters in a novel. The distinction between 
online personae and fictional personae rests primarily on the fact that online identities are backed by a kind 
of intentionality not found in fictional characters. While we can say that Hamlet is motivated by a desire for 
revenge and intends to kill the king, there is sense in which it is different from an online personae who is 
also motivated by revenge and wants to kill a king. In the latter case intentionality originates in a person 
controlling an avatar in a virtual world, whereas in the former case the intentionality originates, 
presumably, in Shakespeare’s imagination. 
8 Turkle, Screen 17. 
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interests, thoughts, and information considered to be notable.9 A home page can be used 
for a variety of personal or professional reasons, or a combination of the two. Some of the 
key features of a home page are theme, content, structural organization, technical features, 
iconography, and modes of address.10 There is no single format for a home page. 
Homepages can be, for example, stand alone web sites, web logs, or a page on a social 
networking web site. What is important about them is that they reflect something about 
their creators.11 In designing a home page one must ask oneself what one plans to project 
into cyberspace which, in turn, may prompt the question “who am I?” In this sense, then, 
you can encounter yourself in cyberspace as you are forced to question your identity and 
choose what kind of online self you want to present. To be sure, in asking the question 
“Who am I?” in cyberspace a distinction can be made between “who am I really” and 
“what image of myself do I want to project. With the latter question, the possibility for 
self-serving motivations or self-deception arises because one need not successfully 
answer the veracity of the first question. With the former question, though, insight can 
still be had into the issue of encountering oneself in cyberspace through either the 
construction of the home page when one is seeking to project a sincere truth-seeking 
reflection of oneself, or in hindsight as one examines one’s home page and realizes 
something new about oneself.  
Questions about one’s self-identity are obviously not unique to cyberspace, since 
individuals with any self-awareness ask these questions in RL. In cyberspace, however, 
there are fewer restrictions on how one can answer them. Consider, for example, people 
in virtual worlds who swap genders and describe their physical characteristics much 
differently than how they appear in RL. For these people the question of “who am I?” 
opens special possibilities because they can choose characteristics that would be 
impossible or difficult to achieve in RL. Whether one is constructing a home page, 
                                               
9 Home page can also refer to the web site that one’s World Wide Web browser loads upon 
starting that program. This is the web site that one is taken to when the “home” button in the browser is 
pushed. The use of “home page” here, however, unless otherwise stated, refers to a personal web site and 
not the default web site for a browser.  
10 Daniel Chandler, “Personal Home Pages and the Construction of Identities on the Web,” 1998, 
Aberystwyth University, United Kingdom, 15 July 2008 
http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/short/webident.html.  
11 Chandler, Home Pages claims that home pages present an “unrivalled opportunity for self-
presentation in relation to any dimension of social and personal identity to which ones chooses to allude.” 
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exploring a virtual world, or experiencing some other facet of cyberspace, there is a sense 
in which one can acquire new kinds of self-knowledge or engage in new forms of self-
deception. If self-knowledge is valuable, then such a consequence is to be desired.  
Turkle advances two positions with regard to the subject of online identity.  The 
first position focuses on the development of the human mind and concludes that there is 
no unity of the self. The second position begins with an argument against “traditional” 
epistemology and concludes with a proposal for an alternative way of acquiring 
knowledge. In the next section I examine how Turkle fits her theoretical framework into 
a socio-historical context. The following three sections develop her two positions and 
relate them to her theory of online identity. I conclude the chapter by questioning aspects 
of Turkle’s respective positions. By taking this approach, Turkle’s claim that we come to 
see ourselves differently in the mirror of the machine12 can be assessed on its merits and 
weaknesses. 
 
1.2 Turkle on Postmodernism 
Turkle claims that upon encountering the ideas of French postmodern thinkers 
such as Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari she was initially unsympathetic but 
ultimately changed her mind because with the advent of the Internet these theories were 
given means by which they could be understood.13 While she was originally sympathetic 
to their views on language and the mind/body problem, their theories, she thought, did 
not seem to match with lived experience.  Part of the reason she thinks the “decentered” 
theories, a term she attributes broadly to postmodern theory, have been slow to catch on 
is because it is hard to challenge the idea of an autonomous ego.14 If we presume there to 
be an autonomous ego, then it makes sense to think of the self as unitary. This view is 
reinforced in everyday life as people are expected to take responsibility for their actions 
as the unified self is treated as a basic reality. So, while these postmodern thinkers 
challenged the notion of an autonomous ego, as well as traditional theories of knowledge, 
                                               
12 Turkle, Screen 9. 
13 Turkle, Screen 15. 
14 Turkle, Screen 15. 
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Turkle adopted these views only when the Internet provided postmodernism with an 
object capable of linking the theory to the lived experience.15 
Turkle compares the ideas of postmodernism to the modernist world view that has 
dominated post-Enlightenment Western thinking.16 Postmodernism, while hard to define 
explicitly, is captured by concepts such as “decentered,” “fluid,” “nonlinear,” and 
“opaque.”17 Opposed to these ideas are traditional modernist concepts such as “linear,” 
“logical,” “hierarchical,” which are thought to have “depths that can be plumbed and 
understood.”18 Turkle emphasizes “the precedence of surface over depth.”19  Her theory 
of online identity can be clarified through an explanation of both what it is, and what it is 
not. 
Turkle claims that computers both embody postmodernism and bring it to earth.20 
The idea that computers could have embodied postmodern theory would have been 
unthinkable in the recent past because in the “modernist computational aesthetic,” 
computers had been thought to epitomize the idea of a calculating machine.21 The idea 
that computers are the ultimate in linear, hierarchical, calculating machines was presented 
as a modern metanarrative not only about the way in which computers worked, but also 
about the way the world works. In others words the modernist metanarrative promised to 
explain, unpack, reduce, and clarify. 22  For Turkle, the metanarrative she calls the 
“culture of calculation” has historically been applied to the idea that the mind and self, 
epistemology, and identity can all be explained, unpacked, and reduced in a linear, 
hierarchical, and logical manner.  
Turkle, however, sees a new and opposing metanarrative arising. In the past 
objects such as turbines, smokestacks, and conveyor belts could be used as objects to 
                                               
15 It should be noted that in discussing Turkle’s position the literature surrounding the subject of 
postmodernism and the concept of metanarratives will not be addressed. The issues, discussions, and 
arguments surrounding postmodern theory as a whole are well beyond the scope of this project. While 
Turkle’s theory and influences are clear, the criticisms leveled at her position concern her specific theory of 
online identity. 
16 Turkle, Screen 17. 
17 Turkle, Screen 17. 
18 Turkle, Screen 17. 
19 Turkle, Screen 44. 
20 The claim that postmodern thought could be brought to earth is a reference to her claim that the 
Internet has legitimized postmodern theory, not a bold metaphysical claim. It is a strange way to use the 
term ‘embody,’ but since that is how she uses it, that is how it is presented. 
21 Turkle, Screen 18. 
22 Turkle, Screen 19. 
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think with for the modernist position. These objects were useful because they provided 
demonstrable examples from which modernist theory could be explained.23 Now, 
however, Turkle claims that postmodernism and the metanarrative she calls “the culture 
of simulation” has found its object-to-think-with.24 The Internet provides Turkle with the 
tools and means for explicating postmodern theory and an account of the decentered 
self.25  
Turkle calls the difference between the culture of calculation and the culture of 
simulation “A Tale of Two Aesthetics.” The distinction lies between what is meant by 
“transparent” as it relates to the modernist theory, and what is meant by “opaque” as it 
relates to the postmodern theory.26 A metaphor used to make this distinction is the 
difference between MS-DOS based computers (PCs) and Macintosh computers. The PC 
is transparent because one can open it up, look under the hood, and know how it works.27 
The Mac on the other hand is opaque, intentionally, because the mechanics are hidden 
and what is important is not the way in which it works but rather the way it is used.28 The 
difference between these two aesthetics, according to Turkle, “is often fought out 
between those who put their faith in reductive understanding (open the box, trust what 
you can see, and analyze completely) and those who proclaim such ideas to be bankrupt 
or at least impractical.”29 
                                               
23 Turkle, Screen 44. 
24 Turkle, Screen 44. 
25 Turkle, Screen 15. 
26 Turkle, Screen 37. 
27 Turkle, Screen 42. 
28 Turkle, Screen 42. 
29 Turkle, Screen 43. This distinction is alive and well today, more than a decade after Screen’s 
publication. To observe it, all one need do is frequent message boards that attract fans of both PCs and 
Macs and find a subject thread that deals with one of those operating systems. It can be quite surprising the 
length such threads can reach as proponents extol the virtues of their preferred system and point to the 
flaws in the other. The arguments often follow the same lines of reasoning Turkle provides, the difference 
between transparency and opaqueness, for both kinds of operating systems.  
There has, however, been a new entry into the debate. Linux, understood broadly to refer to the 
unix-like operating systems being pushed by the open source community, have recently become more 
common due to the ease with which they can be accessed and installed. Linux systems are currently more 
reliant on command line inputs than either of the other systems and have been taken up by some as the 
flagship for transparency in operating systems. However, to gain greater acceptance, Linux developers have 
realized the need for usability and have begun making efforts toward opacity. Windows replaced MS-DOS 
as Microsoft Corporation’s operating system. It introduced a graphical user interface, and is now defended 
by its champions as the best balance between transparency and usability. Apple Corporation was the first to 
introduce a graphical user interface to its operating system, and continues technical and media campaigns 
designed to establish itself as the most opaque, and hence most usable.  
  9 
Turkle claims that the “Macintosh mystique” is indicative of postmodernity as 
computer culture, and our culture in general, places more emphasis and importance on 
surface usability than understanding of mechanics and the way things work.30 The 
“culture of simulation” is a desirable development in human history because it rejects 
supposedly discredited notions about our ability to know anything beyond what is on the 
surface. It should be noted that Turkle concedes that, like all computers, the Mac remains 
“a collection of on/off switches, of bits and bytes, of traveling electrons,” however, the 
Macintosh strove to make these “irrelevant” to the user.31 Again, what’s important and 
interesting is the surface upon which the culture of simulation places a premium. On the 
surface it is tinkering that is important, not rigid command line structures.32 The 
Macintosh is supposed to appeal to the culture of simulation because it was designed to 
be mastered through trial and error as the surface is intuitively probed for function.33 It is 
through the lens of the culture of simulation (for which the Macintosh computer is the 
metaphor) that Turkle fits her theory into the post-modern tradition.  
But does the Internet really embody postmodern theory? Aaron Slevin objects that 
Turkle’s claim that virtual communities have arisen out of a process that has propelled us 
from modernity towards postmodernity is vague and unsupported.34 For Turkle, as 
personal computing became more popular and computers became more user friendly, 
people became less interested in how their machines worked and more interested with the 
purposes they were using them for. Turkle takes this as evidence for the move toward a 
culture of simulation based on her observation that computer culture has rejected the old 
approach to computers and embraced the new movement that places emphasis on 
usability and opacity.35 But Slevin claims the inference is not warranted. 
                                                                                                                                            
Regardless of which actors represent which roles, or whether any of the opinions have merit or can 
be resolved, what is most interesting is that the debate in computer culture along the lines of transparency 
and opacity continues to this day. 
30 Turkle, Screen 35. The term “surface,” the opposite of deep, is important throughout the whole 
of Turkle’s theory, and is examined in greater detail in her section on epistemology. 
31 Turkle, Screen 34. 
32 Turkle, Screen 35. 
33 Turkle, Screen 35. 
34 Aaron Slevin, The Internet and Society (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2000) 107-108. 
35 Slevin, Internet 108. 
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Turkle considers only operating systems and does not give enough attention to the 
hardware side of the equation.36 Computer systems today are often designed so that the 
parts can be upgraded, and consumers are encouraged to improve and replace their own 
component parts.37 There are far more people today than there were in the 1970s who 
open their computers and seek out operational structures. Turkle’s claim that that the 
culture of simulation is supported by the number of people who do not care about the 
workings of their machine’s operating system is to some degree offset by the number 
who care about the inner working of their machine’s hardware. Turkle is right about 
usability being important to consumers, but it seems that market forces can provide a 
better explanation of the rise in graphical operating systems than a shift in cultural 
zeitgeist. Consumers of both operating systems and hardware components prefer products 
that are easier to use and that, in turn, is what informs their purchase decisions. So, 
Turkle has not necessarily shown that postmodernism has found its object to think with. 
But this does not undermine her view that the self is decentered, a claim that is now 
examined. 
 
1.3.1 Turkle on the Mind, and the Self 
Turkle claims that the culture of simulation is emerging in various fields, 
specifically psychology and the area of computer science that deals with artificial 
intelligence. In the field of artificial intelligence, programmers are no longer trying to 
program intelligence in a linear, analytic method of simple rules. Rather, she claims, the 
goal is to design computational objects and structures which can operate somewhat 
independently of each other in an effort to have intelligence emerge: “After all, these 
theorists say, our brains are opaque to us, but this has never prevented them from 
functioning perfectly well as minds.”38 In psychology, Turkle states that the modern 
theory of calculation represented the mind as a centralized structure with programmed 
rules. Today this has changed and the mind is often modeled as complex and 
                                               
36 Again, the PC vs. Mac debate arises. The PC computer is often easier to upgrade, while 
Macintoshes are a notoriously difficult to fix or work on yourself. Keeping with Slevin’s objection, this 
points to Turkle’s unwillingness to acknowledge the importance of hardware to the computer equation. 
37 Slevin, Internet 108. 
38 Turkle, Screen 20. 
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decentralized.39 It is from within this decentered framework that Turkle develops a theory 
of the mind and self, which is then used as part of the foundation for her theory of online 
identity. 
Turkle's conception of the self is based on a theory of the mind that holds that the 
mind is essentially fragmented. The beginnings for this idea are found in the tradition of 
psychoanalytic theory, pioneered largely by Sigmund Freud, which is based upon human 
desires and drives.40  Early psychoanalysis focused on the idea of a drive that provides 
the energy and goals for all mental activity.41 Freud identifies what he calls the “ego” as 
that which regulates one's relationship with the external world, internalizing inner 
“objects” (e.g. the idea of an ideal parent that emerges from one’s outer parental 
relationship) that are deemed important. It is this kind of process that leads to the idea of 
a mechanism, the “superego,” which can be roughly understood as a ‘conscience’. The 
self in this Freudian sense is not completely fragmented since the ego propels the self, but 
the groundwork for later, more fragmented, theories find their origins here. 
According to Turkle, while Freud's theory includes both drives and inner objects, 
later theorists, such as Melanie Klein and Ronald Fairbairn, began to emphasize the 
importance of the inner objects. Object-relations theorists argue that the mind consists of 
many kinds of inner objects that each have their own histories, widening the scope of the 
inquiry to examine what it is that we “bring inside.”42 The mind is described as a society 
of inner agents “suborganizations of the ego capable of generating meaning and 
experience, i.e. capable of thought, feeling, and perception.”43 Here we find the move 
toward fragmentation of the mind and away from the idea of a singular autonomous ego. 
While for Freud the superego is a unitary inner structure that acts on memories, thoughts, 
and wishes, for the object-relations theorists, “the self becomes a dynamic system in 
which the distinction between processor and processed breaks down.”44 The mind is a 
society of inner agents none of which control the whole.  
                                               
39 Turkle, Screen 20. 
40 Turkle, Screen 138. 
41 Turkle, Screen 138. 
42 Turkle, Screen 138. 
43 Turkle, Screen 138. 
44 Turkle, Screen 138. 
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Turkle's view follows the Freudian tradition: the “self” emerges from the 
negotiations and interactions of these inner agents. Jacques Lacan takes the idea of a 
fragmented self further and claims the idea of a centralized ego is illusory. For Lacan 
“only the sense of an ego emerges from chains of linguistic associations that reach no 
endpoint. There is no core self. What we experience as the “I” can be likened to 
something we create with smoke and mirrors.”45 For Lacan the self is a realm of 
discourse and not a permanent structure of the mind.46 Turkle embraces both Freud and 
Lacan’s views, as the former represents the modernist position necessary for the 
postmodern to emerge. This theory of the mind and self is central to Turkle’s theory of 
online identity because it provides the means, among other things, to explain multiplicity 
and invisibility as special characteristics of selves in cyberspace. 
 
1.3.2 Turkle on Epistemology 
How should we think about knowledge? According to Turkle, Western 
philosophy makes a firm distinction between the abstract and the concrete, and goes 
wrong by relying too heavily on abstraction.47 Beginning with Plato, Turkle contends, the 
Western tradition of thought can be understood as “hard.”48 On this view “pure 
mathematics” and “pure science” reign supreme because they filter out messy objects.49 
Turkle alludes to Plato’s definition of knowledge according to which “a process of 
reasoning” is required in addition to truth and perception.50 For Turkle, justification, 
truth, and belief, are unnecessary abstractions the Western philosophical tradition uses to 
explain knowledge. Rather than using propositions to reduce and generalize, Turkle 
claims we should look to concrete objects as the tools for thinking. 
Turkle’s epistemology is based on the idea that the privileged way of knowing is 
through an exploration of the surface.51  Turkle claims that surface exploration is 
privileged, but not necessarily the only way knowing, to allow for the possibility that 
                                               
45 Turkle, Screen 139. 
46 Turkle, Screen 139. 
47 Turkle, Screen 55. 
48 Turkle, Screen 51, 55. 
49 Turkle, Screen 55. 
50 Plato, “from Theatetus,” Readings in Epistemology, Trans. Grube, Ed. Crumbley II (Mountain 
View, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999) 21. 
51 Turkle, Screen 47. 
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there is underlying meaning to the world, but that such meaning is unknowable for us.52 
Turkle proposes “bricolage” as one method whereby we can tinker with objects to obtain 
knowledge.53  She derives these ideas on two 20th century thinkers, the anthropologist 
Claude Levi-Strauss and the psychologist Jean Piaget. 
Bricolage, a term adopted by Levi-Strauss, is “the process of theoretical 
tinkering ... by which individuals and cultures use the objects around them to develop and 
assimilate ideas.”54 It is, according to Turkle, a “soft” methodology, flexible and non-
hierarchical, and is in contrast to the Western analytic tradition.55 Those who practice 
bricolage tend to arrange and rearrange, step back, reconsider and then try again. Turkle 
claims that bricoleurs “approach problem-solving by entering into a relationship with 
their work materials that has more the flavor of a conversation than a monologue.”56 
Bricolage works as a method of navigation because it does not seek deep rooted 
principles, but rather is a process whereby concrete objects are analyzed in relation to 
each other. 
Turkle claims that Piaget found that children begin their reasoning process 
through the analysis of concrete objects, but notes that the process is outgrown as adults 
proceed to a more formal stage of abstraction where propositional logic frees the 
intelligence from requiring “things” to think with.57 According to Turkle, analysis of 
concrete objects also applies to children learning language. They do not learn language 
by being educated on its rules, but rather “through immersion in its cadences.”58 In other 
words, the development of thought is culturally dependant, and modern culture, in its 
plumbing of the depths, forgot how, or made irrelevant, concrete styles of thinking.  
Turkle claims that while relatively few in number, there are examples of bricolage 
in the Western tradition. This can be seen in computer culture, not only among users who 
prefer the Macintosh style of navigation, but also in programming. Programming today 
                                               
52 Turkle, Screen 47. The idea that something could be meaningful yet unknowable for us is, 
presumably, an acknowledgement that there could be beings with faculties greater than, or different from, 
human faculties capable of such knowledge. 
53 Turkle, Screen 55. 
54 Turkle, Screen 48. 
55 Turkle, Screen 56. 
56 Turkle, Screen 51. 
57 Turkle, Screen 55. 
58 Turkle, Screen 61. 
  14 
can occur within programs. Consider, for example, an architect who uses a program for 
building design. This architect places things beside each other, turns things around, and 
may generally approach a job by means of trial and error. In the culture of calculation an 
architect would have had to draw each possibility separately. With architectural programs, 
however, this is no longer the case. Now programmers as bricoleurs can be more like 
painters than logicians.59  
In another example of how bricolage is applicable to programming, Turkle 
describes two students in an introductory computer course.60 These students, one a poet 
and the other a pianist, had strong ties with bricolage-like reasoning. They both wanted to 
approach writing code in the same manner in which they practiced their respective arts. 
They wanted to play with the code and write their own subroutines rather than follow the 
“structured programming” method being taught. Structured programming is a rule-driven, 
top down planning process in which a master plan is sketched out and then broken into 
subroutines to be worked on individually.61 Once completed these subroutines are set 
aside until they are required to integrate into the larger program.62 There are good 
practical reasons for adopting such a method, since it can facilitate troubleshooting and 
promote efficiency. Yet these students insisted on trying to manipulate the code as though 
it were a word in a poem or a musical note. For doing so they were reprimanded to the 
point where they both gave in and “just faked it” or turned “into a different kind of 
person” to get through the class.63 Turkle claims that harm occurred in this example, as 
the students felt alienated and forced to be someone other than they were, which in turn 
caused them anxiety.64 For Turkle, it would seem, that since bricolage and tinkering is the 
better strategy for knowing, and since they are applicable to traditionally analytic subjects 
such as computer programming, the students should not have been punished for their 
strategies, but rather encouraged for their efforts. 
Turkle’s epistemic approach has implications for her theory of online identity 
because of its effects on the issues of self-knowledge and value. Since knowledge can 
                                               
59 Turkle, Screen 52. 
60 Turkle, Screen 53. 
61 Turkle, Screen 53. 
62 Turkle, Screen 51. 
63 Turkle, Screen 54. 
64 Turkle, Screen 54. 
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only be obtained though navigation of the surface, the same is the case for self-
knowledge. To explain how this is done Turkle appeals to Kenneth Gergen’s idea of the 
saturated self. 
Gergen uses the idea of a saturated self to explain how communication 
technologies force us to “colonize each other’s brains.”65 According to Gergen, our selves 
are saturated because we are encountering more diverse voices of humanity, both 
unknown and known, as information and communications technologies, such as the 
Internet, put more people from more places into contact with each other. As we become 
increasingly intertwined in the social sphere we absorb the ideas of others, as “they 
become part of us and we of them.”66 In this way, individual notions of self disappear and 
the relations one has with one’s world become apparent.67  
Howard Rheingold, using the idea of a saturated self, claims that “We live in each 
other’s brains, as voices, images, words on screens … We are multiple personalities and 
we include each other.”68 The idea of saturated selves may cause anxiety or anguish to 
those who feel that they are losing something important and personal with the dissolution 
of individual notions of self. To the contrary, Gergen, Rheingold, and Turkle all believe 
that the saturated self presents new opportunities for discovery of the self.69 Rheingold, in 
an online discussion, had one participant claim that pejorative connotations should not be 
associated with the idea of saturated selves. This person claimed that he or she liked 
being a saturated self in a community of similar saturated selves, and that the big media 
(television and pop music) that provides much of popular culture is not enough to 
successfully intertwine humanity. This person thought that, only online, in virtual 
communities, can the co-saturation of selves truly flourish. Rheingold responded to that 
participant claiming that “I like being a saturated self too.”70 Self-knowledge obtains, 
then, by analyzing oneself in relation to one’s surrounding of which others are very much 
a part.71 
                                               
65 Gergen in Turkle, Screen 257. 
66 Gergen in Turkle, Screen 257. 
67 Gergen in Turkle, Screen 257. 
68 Rheingold quoted in Turkle, Screen 257. 
69 Gergen in Turkle, Screen 257. 
70 Rheingold quoted in Turkle, Screen 258. 
71 Allison Cavanagh, Sociology in the Age of the Internet, (Berkshire, UK: Open University Press, 
2007) challenges Turkle’s claim that one’s identity is constantly in flux because it is contingent on a variety 
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Turkle’s epistemic approach also has implications for the concept of value. 
“Value” is an ambiguous term and depending on who is using it can have different 
meanings. Given Turkle’s epistemology, however, it has to be something explicable in 
concrete terms. In this way, value can be understood as some sort of relation between a 
subject (the one who values) an object (that which is valued). This way of considering 
value is consistent with Turkle’s training as a social scientist. A third-person perspective 
is the approach one takes if one seeks to minimize one’s personal biases toward the 
collection and analysis of data. This outside perspective can also be used to explain how 
it is that concrete subjects and objects can be analyzed in relation to each other. An 
economist can, for example, form judgments on what a subject values by analyzing her 
purchasing behaviour. What is important is that value is understood as some sort of 
observable relation between something capable of valuing and the something valued. 
 
1.3.3 Turkle on Online Identity  
Traditionally, Turkle claims, our notions of identity were forged by our 
communities and culture.72 Identity understood this way is not a claim about the 
metaphysical relation to the concept of self, but rather a descriptive claim that seeks to 
explain how selves identify with their characteristics. For Turkle, identity is about self-
conceptions, not the relation between mind and self. To help us understand how we can 
come to have a self-conception in cyberspace Turkle uses MUDs to isolate three special 
characteristics of online identity: anonymity, invisibility, and multiplicity.73  Turkle 
                                                                                                                                            
of associations. According to Cavanagh, this conclusion does not follow because research into group 
dynamics shows that presentation of oneself precedes association and not the other way around. Along 
these lines, to “generate a social circle, or the connections necessary to develop an online presence, we 
must already have a clear sense of self” (Cavanagh, Sociology 123). While Cavanagh does point to the 
importance of sense of unity for the online experience, an explanation of how such unity arises is not 
explained. Chapter 2 offers an explanation to how unity in cyberspace can be understood. 
72 Turkle, Screen 179. 
73 Turkle, Screen 14. Turkle claims that MUDs are a good media for understanding how people 
can construct and reconstruct their identities with the kind of freedom found in cyberspace. This was 
especially true in the 1990s because virtual worlds did not have the resources or computing power to create 
the more graphically intensive virtual worlds of today. Even though the golden era of MUDs is long gone, 
they are still among the best media available for exploring the concept of online identity. There is a 
simplicity and freedom found in MUDs that captures the special characteristics of online identity, because 
all one needs to do in order to perform an action or appear a certain way is write the text and send the input.  
In “Constructions and Reconstructions of the Self in Virtual Reality,” Cyber Reader: Critical 
Writings For the Digital Era, Ed. Spiller (New York: Phaedon, 2002) 212., Turkle also identifies another 
characteristic, “ongoingness”, which is not dealt with here. Ongoing refers to the fact that one can log on to 
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describes these special characteristics through her first position that identity is not a 
unitary notion, which is examined in the first part of this section. Turkle’s other position, 
that online identity has value because it can increase one’s self-knowledge using these 
special characteristics, is examined in the latter part of this section.  
I choose to focus a large part of my thesis on Turkle, even though there is more 
current research on online identity, because her position can be philosophically 
constructed to present an approach to online identity construction in direct opposition to 
the unified online identity that I develop in the pages that follow. In other words, online 
identity can be decentered (as Turkle claims) or unified (as I argue). Even while 
cyberculture studies have progressed and become more nuanced, the distinction between 
decentered or unified is still important and useful to my project. Moreover, much of the 
literature surrounding online identity is psychological, anthropological or sociological. 
That is to say, this literature does not examine the deeper philosophical issues, such as 
how we even come to have identities in the first place.74 
                                                                                                                                            
a MUD at any given time and have something to do and someone to do it with. Turkle thinks it is 
significant in relation to MUDs compared to more traditional games where people had to schedule 
gatherings. This is a significant distinction between online games and games played in RL. This distinction, 
however, does not capture any special distinction between online identity and RL identity. The 
characteristic of ongoingness is nowhere more apparent than RL where one cannot simply log off and log 
on at will. 
74 In her “Beyond anonymity, or future directions for internet identity research,” Helen Kennedy 
provides a brief but accurate survey concerning the literature of online identity. Following David Silver 
(2000) she identifies three phases within the cyberculture studies. The first phase is labeled “popular 
cyberculture,” and is found in the early popular magazines which anticipated the coming cyberculture. The 
second phase is “cyberculture studies,” for which the works of Rheingold (1993) and Turkle (1996) are 
taken as exemplars. The final stage, “critical cyberculture studies,” is demarcated from its predecessor by a 
more theoretically nuanced and empirically grounded approach (Kennedy, Beyond 2). Kennedy, among 
others, rightly identifies Hall, 1996; Shields, 1996; Baym, 1998; Kendall, 1999; Poster, 1999; and Cheung 
2000 as influential theorists within the field. 
Since 2000 the amount of research into cyberculture and cyber-identity has risen considerably. 
Some examples of this more contemporary research that I find interesting are: Bowker and Tuffin, 2002; 
Perrotta, 2006; Simi and Futrell, 2006; Steinkueler, 2006; Davis, Seider and Gardner, 2008; Gonzalez and 
Hancock, 2008; Sant, 2008; Valkenburg and Peter, 2008; and Calvert et al., 2009. 
In his “Identity and Information Technology,” Steve Matthews presents a more philosophically 
nuanced approach that is found in much of the literature. Matthews acknowledges the importance of the 
normativity for online identity, and then approaches the question from the perspective of social agency. 
This perspective is “in addition” to the Aristotelian thinking animal or the Kantian rational agent.  He 
claims that our conception of identity is in part affected by the way others see us: “Thus, if IT affects the 
way others see me, especially in virtue of the ways it alters various modes of social communication, then it 
will come to affect the way I see myself (Mathews, IIT 144). I do not deny Matthews’ claim, as he does 
raise interesting issues concerning how cyberspace affects our relationships, which in turn affect our self-
conception. On the other hand, I approach the issue of normativity as it relates to cyberspace from the 
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Turkle claims that in the early twentieth century one’s role in the community was 
fixed by social roles and norms and it was hard to deviate from it.75 These roles provided 
the context within which one’s conception of oneself could develop. Those who deviated 
were often on the fringe of society such as shamans, con artists, bigamists, and the cross-
gendered. Today, however, many people’s identities have extended beyond the 
constraints imposed by traditional roles in the community. Turkle attributes this shift in 
part to the culture of simulation.  Individuals today she argues “experience identity as a 
set of roles that can be mixed and matched, whose diverse demands need to be 
negotiated.”76 In this way the Internet is a social laboratory that can be used to 
experiment with constructions and reconstructions of one’s self.77   
In cyberspace we “self-fashion” and “self-create” as we decide what kinds of 
online personae we will assume.78  In MUDs, or cyberspace in general, it is possible to 
create personae which express new or different aspects of oneself.79 For this reason 
Turkle believes online identities imply “difference, multiplicity, heterogeneity, and 
fragmentation.”80 She claims that tension exists in our cyber-experiences that can not be 
resolved through an understanding of the Latin root for the word identity, idem, which 
means ‘the same’.81  Moreover, this tension goes beyond cyberspace and encapsulates the 
condition of our decentered lives beyond the Internet.82 
                                                                                                                                            
perspective of personal agency. I argue that personal agency is required if a theory of online identity is 
going to be established. 
75 Turkle, Screen 179. 
76 Turkle, Screen 180. 
77 Erving Goffman, Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959) offers a 
social psychological theory that compares the way in which we present ourselves to the world through 
social interaction to a theatrical production. On this view the self is an actor who finds itself in a variety of 
situations, in which the world comprises the backdrops and props, and must don the appropriate role or 
mask to deal with the circumstance. Some theorists (Dhao, Grasmuck, and Martin, 2008; Pullen, 2007; 
Robinson, 2007; Papacharissi, 2002) explore the relationship between Goffman’s theory and online 
identity. It is easy to see how this theory could apply to the Internet since we largely get to choose what 
mask is appropriate to specific situations in cyberspace. This literature is interesting, but it is not dealt with 
here because the issues tend to move toward sociological questions, such as the composition of a 
community within which a role can fit, as opposed to more philosophically interesting questions such as 
how can one’s online identity be understood in terms of one’s RL identity. 
78 Turkle, Screen 180. 
79 Turkle, Screen 185. 
80 Turkle, Screen 185. 
81 Turkle, Screen 185. 
82 Eleanor Wynn and James E. Katz, "Hyperbole over Cyberspace: Self-Presentation and Social 
Boundaries in Internet Home Pages and Discourse," The Information Society 13.4: 297-327 (1997), 
challenge the notion that selves truly are multiple in cyberspace on the grounds that Turkle does not place 
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The reality of online selves leads to questions such as “What is the relationship of 
these online selves to what is generally considered the ‘whole person?”’; “Are online 
identities experienced as an expansion of the self or as separate?”; “Can RL selves learn 
from online selves?” and “How do the various aspects of oneself communicate with each 
other?”83  These are the questions which Turkle seeks to answer with her theory of online 
identity. At the heart of her theory is the idea that on the Internet you are the summation 
of your combined identities.84 Turkle summarizes her views toward “identity on the 
Internet,” noting: 
 
So not only are MUDs places where the self is multiple and constructed by 
language, they are places where people and machines are in a new relation 
to each other, indeed can be mistaken for each other. In such ways, MUDs 
are evocative objects for thinking about human identity and, more 
generally, a set of ideas that have come to be known as 
“postmodernism.”85 
 
Turkle’s theory of online identity develops in relation to the specific instantiations of 
anonymity, multiplicity, and invisibility. Turkle is correct that the Internet is like a 
laboratory for the construction and reconstruction of the self. The Internet provides a 
means by which people can explore aspects of their identity which are impossible, or at 
                                                                                                                                            
enough importance on the fact that for online identity to even exist there must first be an historically 
situated being. They argue that Turkle is mistaken in her explanation of how online selves can be created 
distinct from their historical embodied selves. They claim that when people create personae in cyberspace it 
is better to explain the phenomena in terms of programming than identity construction.  
Wynn and Katz’s theory finds its roots in Heidegger and the concept of being which requires a 
“being thrown into” concept of self. Programs accordingly are not “thrown into anything” and do not have 
the intelligence to even pretend to be someone else let alone be anything at all. These programs which 
Turkle considers selves are, to Wyan and Katz, simply artifacts of the being who types the words on the 
client. Hence, they are not equal because the person sitting in the chair can continue to exist without them 
but not the other way around.  
This view may be somewhat uncharitable to Turkle’s position, as she does attempt to reconcile the 
various aspects of one’s RL and online selves. Their point that Turkle does not prioritize the RL self, 
however, is fair. Their explanation for the phenomena of multiplicity, however, leaves something to be 
desired. The idea that online selves, presumably avatars, are simply artifacts propelled by a self, does not 
capture the investment one puts into an online self. There are better ways (see Chapter 2) to draw the 
conclusion that online identity can be traced back to an autonomous self. 
83 Turkle, Screen 180. 
84 Turkle, Screen 13. 
85 Turkle, Screen 17. 
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the least not easy, to construct in RL. These three special features are among the first 
characteristics that spring to mind when considering the subject of online identity.86 
Anonymity on MUDs refers to the way in which users can create personae 
without divulging information about the their RL characteristics. The degree to which 
one can import information about their RL life is the choice of the user.87 Anonymity on 
the Internet is in one sense a default position. It can be considered a default position 
because unless you tell others your proper name the perception is that your true identity 
remains relatively unknown. True anonymity, however, requires some effort and cannot 
be guaranteed. Understood in this way, then, anonymity provides the opportunity for 
people to explore aspects of their selves in online environments without the concern that 
their activities will affect their RL self. 
In technical terms anonymity is “the state of being not identifiable within a set of 
subjects, the anonymity set.”88 Kathleen Wallace describes anonymity as “a form of 
inaccessibility to others to whom one is related or with whom one shares a social 
environment, even if only or primarily in virtue of the effects of one’s actions.”89  On 
Wallace’s account, anonymity is a relational term that connects an anonymous agent with 
others. The anonymous agent is known only through a trait or traits which cannot be 
coordinated with other traits to enable identification. A trait “functions something like the 
referential use of definite description in that it enables the picking out of particular 
entities.”90 An interesting fact about ‘true’ (i.e. perfect) anonymity and the Internet is that 
without taking precautions anonymity is difficult to achieve since IP addresses are 
                                               
86 Shanyang Zhoa, Sherri Grasmuck, and Jason Martin, “Identity construction on Facebook: 
Digital empowerment in anchored relationships,” Computers in Human Behavior 24 (2008): 1817 consider 
disembodiment along with anonymity as contributors to “a technologically mediated environment in which 
a new mode of identity production emerges.”  The subject of embodiment, especially within digital 
environments, is interesting and leads to interesting questions about human nature. I do not deal with the 
subject of embodiment in that larger context.  I consider it, rather, to be a part of the feature of anonymity 
that enables the specialness of online identity. 
87 Turkle, Constructions 212. 
88 Andreas Pfitzman and Marit Hansen. “Anonymity, Unlinkability, Pseudonymity, and Identity 
Management – A Consolidated Proposal for Terminology,” Technische Universität Dresden: Faculty of 
Computer Science (2009) 1 March 2009  http://dud.inf.tu-
dresden.de/literatur/Anon_Terminology_v0.23.pdf 8. 
89 Kathleen Wallace, “Anonymity,” Ethics and Information Technology 1 (1999): 23-35.  25. 
90 Wallace, Anonymity 25. 
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recorded and logged by various parties.91 The sense in which anonymity is considered a 
default position on the Internet generally has more to do with the feeling of anonymity 
one has while traversing cyberspace. 
For Turkle anonymity enables Internet users to explore various aspects of their 
selves. For example, a young man named Matt from a socially prominent family uses the 
anonymity of cyberspace to protect his family from the possible harms his online actions 
could cause.92 Matt’s relationship with his father is estranged due to the latter’s career 
commitments and heavy drinking. Matt uses MUDs to explore the role of “ideal father” 
in an attempt to work through his issues, by creating personae that fulfill the role of 
helper and advisor.93 One need not have extenuating circumstances such as Matt’s for 
anonymity to enable the exploration of the self in cyberspace, however. Simply by not 
revealing characteristics about oneself online the door is opened for self-creation in such 
a way that it does not depend upon any RL contingencies. 
It is important to note that anonymity is in principle a value-neutral term. This is 
to say that there is nothing about the concept of anonymity that makes gives it good or 
bad per se. In some cases, such as whistle-blowing web sites, anonymity is beneficial. In 
other cases, such as online stalking, it can be harmful. Anonymity is a central feature of 
online identity, then, because it gives people the chance to express multiple and often 
unexplored aspects of themselves, to play with their identities and to try out new ones.94 
Multiplicity in cyberspace refers to the fact that one can create and recreate any 
number of concurrent identities. Anonymity enables multiplicity because, as Turkle states,  
 
Anonymously, I travel their rooms and public spaces (a bar, a lounge, a 
hot tub). I create several characters, some not of my biological gender, 
who are able to have social and sexual encounters with other characters. 
On different MUDs, I have different routines, different friends, different 
names.95 
 
                                               
91 IP stands for Internet Protocol and is the system in which a computer network identifies and 
routes traffic. Every Internet connection can be traced to an IP address, so unless precautions are taken, 
such as through the use of anonymizing software, one’s online actions are traceable. 
92 Turkle, Screen 191-192. 
93 Turkle, Screen 191. 
94 Turkle, Screen 12. 
95 Turkle, Screen 15. 
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Multiplicity is possible in MUDs because one person can create several different 
personae on one or various MUDs.96  In the context of the Internet more generally, 
multiplicity compounds, as not only can a person have his virtual world personae, but 
also aspects of his self in other online media such as discussion forums, social 
networking web sites, and Internet Relay Chat groups. Multiplicity, according to Turkle, 
is a pivotal feature of her culture of simulation, since “each player can create many 
characters and participate in many games, the self is not only decentered but multiplied 
without limit.”97 In this way, multiplicity as found on the Internet contributes to a general 
reconsideration of the notion of a unitary self in the culture of simulation.98 
 A large part of the specialness found in multiplicity relies on the anonymity factor. 
There is a sense in which our RL selves are multiple, as our lives become more complex 
and our roles more ambiguous. In RL people are often forced to switch between identities 
and roles depending on the situation. The difference between multiplicity in a RL self and 
online self, however, is found in the way in which in RL all actions can be observed as 
originating from the same body. In cyberspace, given the shield of anonymity, such 
actions cannot be traced back to the same body. The fragmentation of the online self 
allows one to observe multiple identities not connected to an RL body, and possibly 
unconnected to each other. 
Invisibility, according to Turkle, is the ability in cyberspace to choose and self-
identify with characteristics in ways not easily done outside of cyberspace.99 Invisibility 
is possible on MUDs because of the “anonymous social interaction in which you can play 
a role as close to or as far away from your real self as you choose.”100 Even though 
Turkle uses invisibility to refer to a special feature of cyberspace, that which is hidden is 
one’s RL self or certain aspects of one’s RL self. In other words, it is your RL self that is 
invisible in cyberspace, because one is not bound by RL characteristics, such as age. For 
example, on a MUD one can be slim, overweight, pretty, homely, furry, smooth, male, 
female, funny, obtuse, inanimate, non-conscious, and the list goes on. This is quite 
different than one’s characteristics in RL where one is constrained by the kind of being 
                                               
96 Turkle, Constructions 212. 
97 Turkle, Screen 185. 
98 Turkle, Screen 260. 
99 Turkle, Constructions 212. 
100 Turkle, Screen 183.  
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one happens to be in RL. This is not to say that some characteristics in RL cannot be 
chosen, such as fashionably stylish or not, but rather to point to the fact that in cyberspace 
there are fewer restrictions.101 
 For instance, Turkle interviewed a man named Gordon whose grade school 
experience was unhappy.102 He attributed his inability to fit in with the other children to 
his weight, appearance, and lack of athleticism. When he participated in a trip to India 
with students from around the world, however, he noticed that he was no longer 
constrained by his unpopularity at home, and was able to make friends. Gordon found 
that he could recreate this experience of a fresh start on MUDs. Whenever Gordon feels 
the need for a fresh start he creates a new persona with whichever characteristics he 
chooses. Sometimes he creates personae that are like him but more cheeky, other times he 
takes on the characteristics of an older more reserved observer, and sometimes he creates 
female personae.103 Invisibility provides Gordon with the ability to reinvent himself 
whenever he feels the need to be born again.104 
Turkle also uses Gordon as an example of how invisibility and the culture of 
simulation challenge the conventional distinction between one’s constructed personae 
and one’s “real self.”105 Slippages occur because the conventional unitary notion of 
identity fails to hold.  
 
Gordon’s MUD-playing exhibits some of the slippage I referred to earlier. 
By creating diverse personae, he can experiment in a more controlled 
fashion with different sets of characteristics and see where they lead. He is 
also able to play at being female, something that would be far more 
difficult to do in real life. Each of his multiple personae has its 
independence and integrity, but Gordon also relates them all to 
“himself.”106 
 
The idea of slippage between one’s RL self and one’s online selves leads to a problem for 
Turkle: how do we reconcile our multiple and invisible identities within one person? 
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Considering Gordon, how is it that his online selves can have independence and integrity 
and, at the same time, relate to the person sitting in RL in front of the computer? 
Turkle addresses this problem of “how we [can] be multiple and coherent at the 
same time” by appealing to Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts of consciousness theory and 
his notion of a flexible self.107 The flexible self resides somewhere between the unitary 
notion of the self (exemplified by traditional social roles) and a fragmented self 
(exemplified by multiple personality disorder).108 For Turkle, the flexible self is 
characterized by open channels of communication between one’s various aspects of self. 
She claims that by striving for this kind of open communication one comes to 
acknowledge, respect, and value the diversity within us and within others.109 Even if we 
analyze all these lines of communication with one’s flexible self, however, the issue of 
how they relate back to one RL person still remains. To overcome this problem Turkle 
appeals to a position advanced by Donna Haraway who claims a “split and contradictory 
self” is a “knowing self”:  
 
The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply 
there and original; it is always constructed and stitched together 
imperfectly; and therefore able to join with another, to see together 
without claiming to be another.110 
 
Is an appeal to a split and contradictory self adequate? The embrace of contradiction is 
worrisome, and yet at the same time, does provide an apparent solution for Turkle’s 
problem. Her theory of online identity can be maintained only if a self can exist in 
contradiction as multiple, partial, yet whole at the same time. This problem is addressed 
in section 1.4, where I show that Turkle’s position cannot completely be reduced to a 
contradictory self. 
 
1.3.4. Turkle on the Value of Online Identity 
Turkle uses her theory of online identity to make claims about the value of 
exploring oneself in cyberspace. Value, like knowledge, for Turkle, has to be found 
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through the analysis of concrete objects. On this theory, the value of online identity is 
found in its ability to increase our self-knowledge, as well as to enhance our relations 
with each other.111 In both cases, the object of analysis is lines of communication, as they 
apply to a flexible self communicating with its various aspects, as well as to the flow of 
communication between people. She is also careful to note, however, that such rewards 
are lost if the real gets lost in the virtual. 
Turkle states that “self-knowledge has always been at the heart of philosophical 
inquiry.”112 This could very well be the case: Socrates did say that “An unexamined life 
is not worth living.”113 But how does having online identity contribute to an enhancement 
of self-knowledge distinct from the self-knowledge obtained in RL? Again, the concepts 
of multiplicity and invisibility, as special features of online identity, are relevant.  
The Internet allows people to explore various aspects of themselves either in play or for 
other more therapeutic reasons. By creating multiple and invisible identities people are 
able to learn things about themselves that might not otherwise have been learned. It is in 
this way, she claims, that the culture of simulation “may help us achieve a vision of a 
multiple but integrated identity whose flexibility, resilience, and capacity for joy comes 
from having access to our many selves.”114  By taking this approach Turkle sheds light on 
how the Internet and cyber selves can be valuable. 
Multiplicity in cyberspace can enhance self-knowledge because it allows for 
aspects of oneself to be explored without restriction from other aspects. Anonymity 
enables the separation of online selves such that other Internet users cannot easily relate 
one’s online selves to each other. An easy way to make this separation is to register with 
different names when signing up on web sites. This separation allows one’s various 
online identities to proceed with their affairs unrestricted by the possible commitments of 
one’s other identities. Moreover, this separation can even allow one to project 
contradictory opinions without dissonance between the online selves. For instance, to 
better understand the issue of euthanasia one could register two accounts on the same 
web forum, and then passionately argue for each side of the debate. Multiplicity is also 
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special in the sense that the number of identities that can be projected at the same time is 
limited only by desire and computer resources. 
Invisibility in cyberspace can enhance one’s self-knowledge allowing one to have 
different kinds of experiences than could be had otherwise in RL. It is impossible in RL 
for someone to be, with the exception of the human characters, a kind of sentient being 
from J.R.R. Tolkein’s Lord of the Rings. Yet, across cyberspace, Dwarves, Elves, and 
Orcs run rampant in various virtual worlds. Similarly, people have experiences which 
may not be impossible, but are very difficult to achieve in RL. Gordon, the young man 
who enjoyed the experience of fresh starts in cyberspace, created a female persona and 
swapped gender in cyberspace. To have a female experience in RL Gordon could 
undertake various actions, such as cross dressing or body modification, but should he not 
wish to go to such lengths, cyberspace provides a medium in which such experiences can 
be had without much commitment or cost. Invisibility, then, contributes to self-
knowledge because it provides an opportunity for people to learn things about themselves 
that they may not have discovered otherwise. Examples of such discoveries might include 
what it must be like to live in a world made for large people when you are only a Hobbit 
(providing you left the Shire), or perhaps how gender influences the way you are treated 
or treat others. 
When combined, multiplicity and invisibility in cyberspace provide even greater 
opportunities to acquire self-knowledge. In a rather mundane example, Turkle provides 
Annette as an example of how online identity can be used to help people overcome 
barriers they may face in RL. Annette is a forty-two-year old nurse who writes poetry 
online under the name Bette. Annette claims that assuming the online identity of Bette 
makes it easier to write poetry: 
 
I like to close my eyes and imagine myself speaking as Bette. An 
authoritative voice. When I type as Bette I imagine her voice. You might 
ask whether this Bette is real or not. Well, she is real enough to write 
poetry. I mean it’s poetry that I take credit for. Bette gives courage. We 
sort of do it together.115 
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Multiplicity is observed in the example of Bette because two observable aspects 
of her self emerge. One aspect is a RL nurse, while the other is a poet. The multiplicity is 
very simple since only two identities are being considered. It is not hard to see, though, 
how additional online selves could be added by opening a new window and creating 
another aspect of oneself. Anonymity enables Annette’s multiplicity because the chain 
that links the RL person with her poetry is partially severed. Invisibility is also observed 
in this example because, even though Bette is very similar to Annette, the online self has 
more courage when it comes to sharing her poetry. Anonymity enables Annette’s 
invisibility because without it she could not sever the link between herself and others. If 
the online community, for whom the poetry is being presented, knew that the poet is the 
forty-two-year old nurse who works at the downtown hospital and lives in that area, 
Annette would, presumably, be as nervous releasing her poetry online as she is in RL.  
Hence, multiplicity and invisibility allow Annette to enhance her self-knowledge. 
Turkle concedes that Annette is not disassociated from Bette and that the latter 
does not act autonomously. In other words, Annette is a flexible self that has many parts. 
One part is a nurse who is shy about releasing her poetry. The other part is an 
authoritative poet unafraid to speak out. They relate to each other through lines of 
communication as the online self relays information about how to open up and present 
one’s work to the world back to the RL self. Turkle’s point is that the boundary between 
self and role becomes increasingly permeable as the self becomes more fluent in the role. 
If the role is developed online, as it is in the case of Annette, and one learns something 
about oneself in the process, then that is a good thing.116 
Finally, Turkle’s theory has ethical implications. She claims that in the culture of 
simulation, with its multiple viewpoints, a new moral discourse is needed: “we work to 
know ourselves in order to improve not only our own lives, but those of our family and 
society.”117 Turkle does not state how an ethical theory grounded in the culture of 
simulation would accomplish such goals. She does claim, however, that self-knowledge 
is at the heart of philosophy. Any such theory, then, would have to somehow incorporate 
the analysis of concrete objects in pursuit of self-knowledge. This would exclude many of 
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the ethical theories traditionally associated with the Western philosophical tradition 
which analyze concepts such as duty, utility, and virtue. Because these concepts are not 
concrete objects they should be abandoned in favour of concrete particulars. One 
example of such a particular could be cooperative relations. These relations could be 
analyzed as lines of communication between individuals. The goal of ethics, on this kind 
of framework, would be to resolve problems by considering real people and using open 
lines of communication as the tools of resolution. The better we know ourselves and 
develop our internal lines of communication, the better prepared we are to improve the 
lives of those around us, as well as our own. Cyberspace, then, can help us learn about 
ourselves and others in such a way as to strengthen the ties that bind.118 
 
1.4 An Objection to Turkle’s Account of the Mind and Self 
This section picks up with the worry raised in section 1.3.3. The worry is that 
Turkle’s view that the decentered self is a flexible self does not adequately acknowledge 
the flexible self’s role in binding the disparate aspects of the self.119 Turkle, in fact, 
distances herself from this unifying mechanism by appealing to a knowing self as “split 
and contradictory,” which leads her to conclude, “We do not feel compelled to rank or 
judge the elements of our multiplicity.”120 The problem for Turkle is that on one hand she 
concedes that the flexible self functions as a mechanism for holding the aspects of oneself 
together, but on the other hand she distances herself from the implications for such a view. 
The objection to Turkle’s theory, then, is that her argument draws a self-undermining 
conclusion. Turkle’s appeal to the flexible self is an admission that selves are 
fundamentally unified (even if only partly) in functional terms.  
Turkle’s claim that “your identity on the computer is the sum of your distributed 
presence” captures the idea that online selves can be multiple and, to an extent, 
contradictory.121 As already established, online identity is special in the sense that the 
technological layer of the Internet provides a kind anonymity that can be used to sever 
identifying traits between online selves. These multiple selves can contradict with each 
                                               
118 Turkle, Screen 269. 
119 Here “flexible” means characterized by open channels of communication between different 
aspects of the self 
120 Turkle, Screen 261, 262. 
121 Turkle, Screen 13. 
  29 
other because, other things being equal, there is no way to hold them accountable for 
their differing opinions, characteristics, etc. Turkle’s definition of online identity, 
however, also states that these particular aspects of the self compose a sum. This 
summation is found in her use of the flexible self as the tool for keeping a self multiple 
and coherent at the same time. While the flexible self is a nice way to think about how 
one’s multiple aspects of self communicate with each other, it makes no sense to think of 
it as contradictory. We cannot think of the flexible self as contradictory because it has 
nothing to be in contradiction with. Even if the disparate particulars of the self-set 
contradict each other, when they are added together only one self remains. This is why 
Turkle cannot completely reduce the flexible self to a contradictory self. 
This objection leads to another problem for Turkle’s theory. Even if Turkle were 
to concede that the flexible self cannot be completely reduced to a contradictory self, her 
epistemic commitments leave her bereft of tools for analyzing the flexible self as its own 
thing. In section 1.3.2 it was shown that Turkle believes concrete objects ought to be the 
tools of analysis. These commitments cohere with her theory when the objects of analysis 
are the disparate aspects of self, because they can be analyzed in relation to each other. 
Turkle’s theory, however, does not have the resources to analyze the flexible self as its 
own thing because there are no concrete objects to which it can be compared. Presumably, 
we each have only one flexible self. If we are to understand the aspect of ourselves that 
maintains the whole, we have use tools of abstraction to analyze the flexible self as its 
own thing to see what properties can be found. If the flexible self is going to be analyzed 
as its own thing, then more tools than what Turkle provides are required. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
Turkle is right that minds are fragmented and selves decentered. Such an idea, 
however, is not the exclusive domain of a decentered theory; in fact, it is probably 
conventional wisdom today that the mind works as a series of inner agents from which 
aspects of the self emerge.122 Turkle uses these features of the mind to explain the special 
online characteristics of multiplicity and invisibility. These characteristics are indeed 
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special since they show how online identity is different from RL identity, largely due to 
online anonymity.  
 As I have shown, however, Turkle’s conclusion that the self is capable of 
persisting in a self-contradictory condition does not follow from her argument. Even if 
the self is flexible and able to bind disparate aspects of one self, that flexible self is 
functionally important, to maintain integrity. Moreover, if it is conceded that there is in 
fact something there capable of analysis, then Turkle’s epistemology, that places a 
premium on surface knowledge acquired through the analysis of concrete particulars, is 
not capable of fully exploring such a thing. Her theory cannot examine the self as a thing 
by itself because her theory holds that there must always be something concrete with 
which to compare it. To explain a theory of online identity in a unified sense, one must 
dig deeper than only surface analysis. 
 In the next chapter I examine a theory of identity that can both account for the 
failings of Turkle’s account of online identity, and keep the specialness found in 
multiplicity and invisibility. This theory has the tools to explain how we can understand 
the unifying feature of the self by examining the phenomenological experience of identity. 
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2. PRACTICAL IDENTITY IN CYBERSPACE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A person’s identity can be understood as unified in the sense that the 
phenomenological experience of human consciousness forces human beings to relate to 
their actions as autonomous beings. A phenomenological approach focuses on the 
description of experience. In this case, the experience is autonomy found in the process of 
reflective endorsement. The phenomenological account presented here is comprised of 
two parts. The first part is a description of the way self-conscious beings, such as human 
beings, must have reasons for their actions. This process leads to the second part, a 
description of how reasons are chosen such that one’s life is considered worth living. 
These two parts are found in Christine Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, and are 
used as the basis for a theory of unified online identity. Following Korsgaard, I argue for 
a conception of autonomy as useful and necessary, and an account of value that can 
explain the origins of value, to account for online experience as unified in at least this one 
sense. 
Korsgaard argues for a theory of normativity that justifies a Kantian theory of 
ethics. Normativity refers to the property or quality of being normative, that which serves 
as a standard for prescriptive judgments. Korsgaard’s search for this ethical standard, 
while Kantian in its argument for a categorical imperative, deviates from Kant by finding 
the source of normativity in our practical identities, rather than through a concept of 
noumenal freedom. While both Korsgaard and Kant accept a phenomenal experience of 
freedom, only the latter grounds obligation in noumenal freedom. Practical identity is not 
understood in terms of scientific facts (that would be a theoretical conception of identity), 
but rather in terms of the way in which we consider our lives to have value. 
Practical identity arises from self-consciousness. The structure of human 
consciousness is reflective because distance can be placed between our mental states and 
our awareness of them. It is by virtue of having reasons that we are able to express our 
practical identities, and, conversely, it is by rejecting that which our practical identity 
forbids that we accumulate obligations. The source of obligation is autonomy, as we 
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identify with principles or laws that guide our lives. It is this sense of identity that is 
explored and examined in the context of cyberspace.   
While Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity covers many issues, most notably 
moral obligation, the focus of this chapter is the way in which beings with practical 
identities self-identify. This focus is found in the idea of integrity as an explanation of 
how self-identities are maintained. While Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity may 
not be the only way to make an argument for a theory of unified online identity, her 
explanation of the phenomenological experience of what it means to be an agent is both 
persuasive and has interesting ethical consequences. I do not take a position on these 
ethical results, however, as my project is simply to use Korsgaard’s theory of practical 
identity to show how our online identities are unified, in one sense, because they 
originate in free and autonomous human beings. In section 2.3.2 these ethical results are 
examined for their implications for online ethics, but that does not mean that the position 
is argued for. 
 
2.2.1 Korsgaard on Self-Consciousness 
According to Korsgaard, self-consciousness for humans refers to a structure of the 
mind that is self-reflective. A self-reflective view of the mind is opposed to a view in 
which the mind is internally luminous or directly accessible with any kind of certainty. 
She claims that some philosophers may believe that the mind is directly accessible 
because introspection seems to lead to certainty with regard to our thoughts and 
feelings.123 It is not however explicitly stated which philosophers may make this claim 
but she notes that she, Kant, and many contemporary philosophers do not believe such a 
claim.124 According to Korsgaard, “The reflective structure of the mind is a source of 
‘self-consciousness’ because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves”125 Viewing 
the mind in this way has the benefit of being able to hold on to a concept of the self 
without engaging in the messy business of proving the existence of a metaphysical self. A 
self is the concept that a being with a reflective mind uses to understand one’s experience 
of consciousness. 
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While the self-reflective mind cannot access itself directly, it does allow a person 
to turn his attention towards his perceptions and desires. The reflective mind creates a 
distance between itself and its mental activities by thinking about them.126 It is in this 
way that our mental activities are different than those of most other animals whose 
perceptions are their beliefs and their desires their will.127 It is really remarkable that 
humans can do this. Such a common feature of our everyday experience is easily taken 
for granted, and often overlooked in our day to day activities. Of all the animals on the 
planet only human beings seem capable of such a high degree of reflection. This feature 
of our minds is at the heart of philosophy, for without it Socrates’ famous dictum, “An 
unexamined life is not worth living,” would be incomprehensible, for we would be 
incapable of such examination.128 The structure of a self-conscious mind, then, is 
important because it is the starting point for an examination of how we come to identify 
with ourselves, and ultimately how we identify with our online selves.  
This point is important for a theory of unified online identity because for a theory 
to be considered unified the source of unification should be identified. Self-consciousness 
originates and resides in human minds and these minds reside in human bodies outside of 
cyberspace.129 To show that this is not the case, a self-reflective mind outside of a human 
body would have to be demonstrated: an event which has yet to occur. Consider, for 
example, a bot.130 Even though bots can count, read, and perform various functions, and 
may even be considered conscious in a minimal sense, there is no reason to suppose that 
these programs are self-reflective (understood as the ability to place distance between 
oneself and one’s mental activities). Not until programs are capable of self-reflection can 
they be self-conscious and able to create identities. Without a RL self-conscious being, 
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capable of acting in cyberspace, there can be no cyber-selves. This relationship between 
self-reflection and identity becomes even clearer when the subject of value is examined. 
Concerning online identity, unity occurs within the mind of a self-reflective being 
capable of reflecting on its condition of being online. RL is where self-consciousness 
originates and cyberspace is an environment one can visit with that self-consciousness. 
 
2.2.2 Korsgaard on the Problem of the Normative and Reasons for Action 
A problem arises from our ability to place distance between ourselves and our 
mental activities, which Korsgaard calls the “problem of the normative.”131 This distance 
is created by turning one’s attention towards one’s mental activities. In the case of some 
perceptions, we perceive and then we have an impulse to believe. We can then step back 
and consider that impulse. The impulse no longer dominates us, like it would most other 
animals, and we have a problem: “Is this perception really a reason to believe?”132 
Looking at what appears to be a crooked stick in the water, for example, can make us ask 
whether it is really crooked since we know that refraction may cause it to appear just that 
way. In the case of desires, we have a desire, which is then followed by an impulse to act. 
Again, we can step back and reflect on that impulse thereby taking away its power to 
dominate us. A similar problem arises: “Is this desire really a reason to act?”133 A person 
unable to answer such questions would be unable mentally or physically to move forward. 
Someone could examine his environment thoroughly and see the things around himself, 
but would keep wondering if his perceptions could be believed and query every desire 
that might commit him to an action. 
 The “problem of the normative,” then, is the problem that beings with reflective 
structures of the mind must face because they cannot settle upon perceptions and desires 
“as such.”134 The problem cannot be resolved so that it goes away, rather the problem lies 
in its inescapability. It is inescapable because the reflective structure of the mind forces 
us to act for reasons. It is through this process, acting on reasons, that we come to identify 
with ourselves and understand our will as a lawmaking process -- and this is how we 
differ from non-human animals. 
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Consider, for example, the simple task of turning on your computer. First, you see 
your computer, but because you can place distance between yourself and your mental 
states you can ask whether you really are, in fact, truly seeing your computer. You 
consider the question, and come to the conclusion that since it appears the same as it did 
yesterday, and do you not think that anyone would have entered your home and switched 
it for a replica. Concluding that it is your computer, you overcome the problem of the 
normative because you have settled on reasons for the belief. To turn on the computer, 
perhaps to see if your potential future spouse replied to your comment on a dating web 
site, also requires that you act on a reason. Again, since distance can be placed between 
one’s desires and one’s mental states, it can be questioned whether the desire is really a 
reason to act. Thinking that you do not have any plans for the weekend, and perhaps are a 
bit lonely, you decide that, yes, the desire is a reason to act. By turning on the computer, 
you once again overcome the problem of the normative because you have settled on a 
reason to act on that desire.  
Dealing with the problem of the normative pervades our lives as we are forced to 
continually face it. Notice, though, that most, if not all, other non-human animals do not 
face such a problem. When we ask “Why did the chicken cross the road?” we are in risky 
territory implying that a chicken could have reasons for its beliefs and actions. It is easy 
to ascribe reasons to non-human animals because it is such a pervasive aspect of our lives. 
That does not mean, however, that other animals have the same experience. Human 
beings, as rational animals, are special, because reasons resolve the problem of the 
normative and allow one to commit to a course of action to move on. A reason puts a stop 
to the reflective scrutiny that one’s perceptions and desires face.135 
“Reason,” according to Korsgaard means “reflective success” and is used 
normatively, just as ‘Good!’ and ‘Right’ can mean “I’m satisfied, I’m happy, I’m 
committed, you’ve convinced me, let’s go. The work of reflection is done.”136 To have a 
reason to act is to endorse a desire or impulse upon reflection. They are needed if our 
perceptions and desires are going to withstand reflective scrutiny.137 Yet, Korsgaard notes 
that one could be a sceptic about the ‘good’ and the ‘right’ by holding to the claim that 
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the problems of reflection are insoluble and that nothing will ever count as reflective 
success.138  
With regard to this skeptical position, Korsgaard points to Kant who labeled this 
the fear of “the unconditioned.” This problem is described by Kant in terms of freedom. 
For Kant the reflective mind could only operate under the idea of freedom: “we cannot 
conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside with 
respect to its judgments.”139 In other words, the person with a reflective mind must 
endorse an impulse or desire before he can act, because the motivation for that action 
cannot be conceived to have originated anywhere else than the reflective mind. It is in 
this way that, while we act on desires through reasons, we do so freely.140 But how is it 
that we are able to settle upon a reason for action?  
Kant addresses the problem of continually questioning one’s reasons in terms of 
freedom and the idea of a free will. Freewill, for Kant, is a rational causality which is 
effective and not determined by any alien cause including one’s desires and 
inclinations.141 The problem with freewill is that because it is a causality it must have a 
law but, since it is free it must somehow be its own law.142 The first formulation of the 
categorical imperative, the Formula of Universal Law, solves this problem by stipulating 
that we act only on a maxim that could be willed as a law. This is to say that when we act 
upon an inclination we create a maxim and that process necessarily makes it a law.  
The form of our maxims is vital for determining that we are acting on a good 
maxim or law. Furthermore, the form is important because it is the means by which the 
thinking self can ensure that it is governing well. According to Korsgaard a good maxim 
is an “intrinsically normative entity.”143 Every maxim has two parts: purpose and form. 
Maxims can be understood in terms of their form by considering the purpose and the 
action. Korsgaard claims that a maxim for action will usually take the form of “I will do 
action-A in order to achieve purpose-P.”144 A maxim is good, then, when the action and 
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the purpose are related “so that the maxim can be willed as a law.”145 This is the answer 
to how we ensure that the laws made by the Formula of Universal Law have authority. A 
maxim is an intrinsically normative entity whose power rests in its functional 
arrangement such that it can be acted upon. As a result the normativity that allows us to 
be autonomous is constitutively found in our maxims as it enables us to do what we want 
to do. When you turn on your computer to check your e-mail, for example, that action 
can be understood as the maxim, “I will do action-A (turn on the computer) in order to 
achieve Purpose-P (check my e-mail). If the action and purpose relate in such a way that 
the action can be willed, then it is a good maxim because it can be understood as a law 
that could be obeyed. Whether you act on that law or not is your choice. 
Kant offers a transcendental argument for a conception of freedom that cannot be 
known because its existence cannot be proven. However, because we have the experience 
of freedom our actions must fall under the idea of freedom.146 Kant’s position allows him 
to claim that the wanton and egoist are not autonomous because they are not in 
conformity with the moral obligations of the categorical imperative.147 Kant’s categorical 
imperative, it should be mentioned, is a model of rationality he develops to derive moral 
requirements.  
Korsgaard, on the other hand, in her attempt to naturalize Kant’s argument, makes 
a distinction between the categorical imperative and the moral law. The moral law is a set 
of a priori moral principles deduced through reason which ought to govern the actions of 
rational beings. This distinction is needed because Korsgaard’s version of the categorical 
imperative does not entail the Kingdom of Ends formulation, so wantons and egoists are 
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believes, apply only to herself. 
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acting freely, although they may not care about the moral community.148 This is a thorny 
issue with regard to moral obligations, however, because my account of online identity 
does not involve the moral law, but only the categorical imperative, what seems a 
problem for Korsgaard is not a problem for my view.149 Korsgaard’s position is well 
situated to use in a theory of unified online identity because practical identity is grounded 
solely in human biology and human psychology, and is able to explain the experience of 
autonomy, non-moral obligations, and maxims for action in cyberspace. 
 
2.2.3 Korsgaard on Practical Identity 
The way in which a person identifies with her reasons for action determines her 
practical identity, and through this Korsgaard explains obligations, autonomy, and 
maxims for action. The reflective structure of the mind forces us to have a self-
conception. From the third person perspective one’s self-conception can be explained by 
identifying inclinations, assigning them weight, and declaring winners and losers. From 
the inside however, as Korsgaard notes, “that isn’t the way it is for you when you 
deliberate.”150 When deliberating we feel as though there is something personal that goes 
beyond competing inclinations, something that is ‘you’ which chooses the impulses you 
act upon, and do not act upon. You are a law unto yourself in just this way. You make 
decisions based upon principles that you identify as expressively your own. 
This is a practical conception of identity because it is understood not as a 
scientific fact but rather as a description of how you value yourself.  How you value 
yourself is shown by how you choose among competing desires and beliefs to best reflect 
the life you decide to lead. According to Korsgaard practical identity is: 
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150 Korsgaard, Normativity 100. 
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a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such 
conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a 
certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain 
profession, someone’s lover, and so on. And all of these identities give 
rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your 
nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.151 
 
 
As a result, it can be seen how one’s practical identity is based upon one’s endorsed 
reasons for action. Understood this way, practical identity lends itself to examples of 
multiplicity and invisibility in cyberspace. The jumble of conceptions can incorporate 
everything from that of a personal e-mail user, to one’s existence as a sentient tree in the 
land of Middle Earth. In Chapter Three I examine in greater detail the various ways in 
which Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity can be applied to cyberspace. The priority 
for now, however, is to explain the phenomenological experience of practical identity. 
Obligation arises from what your practical identity forbids. If your practical 
identity as a web forum participant includes being helpful, you would inter alia have an 
obligation not be dismissive and rude to those who sincerely need your help. Korsgaard 
suggests that the relationship between identity and obligation can be found in common 
phrases such as ‘I couldn’t live with myself if I did that’ or ‘just who do you think you 
are?’152 This relationship, whether self-imposed or imposed upon others, is realized by 
asking what you cannot do or what others ought not to do based on a conception of 
practical identity.  
Integrity is the term used to explain how one’s normative conception of self can 
be preserved and maintained through time. Integrity means oneness or unity, and we use 
the term for those who live up to their own standards. To violate an obligation is to lose 
integrity and therefore one’s practical identity. When obligations are violated a person 
can no longer view themselves (unless they are extremely self-deceptive) under the rubric 
they once did. In some cases a person may rather be dead than violate their strongest 
obligations.153 When a person has integrity he commits to his reasons for practical 
identity as well as the ensuing obligations. 
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There are cases however in which this notion of obligation is challenged. 
Korsgaard observes two complexities which arise from this relationship between identity 
and obligation. First, some parts of our identities are easily shed and, in some cases when 
obligations conflict, ought to be shed. Her example for this complexity is “a good soldier 
obeys orders, but a good human being doesn’t massacre the innocent.”154 This 
complication is not that troublesome as we are often, throughout our lives, forced to 
balance various aspects of our practical identity. In other words, life sometimes throws us 
into complicated situations where we are forced to choose less than ideal courses of 
action. 
Second, and more problematic, is the fact that our practical identities can take a 
few knocks and remain intact.155 Consider, as an example of how an otherwise good 
person who can occasionally do wrong, an otherwise honest online auction broker who is 
caught, one time, manipulating customer feedback. Supposing that this person had 
previously been an exemplar of online trading it is entirely imaginable that her potential 
customers could forgive her for the transgression. Moreover, if she chooses not to engage 
in such illicit behaviour again, she can continue to consider herself as an honest person. 
What if, however, she is caught being manipulative again? To balance one’s integrity, 
Korsgaard’s appeals to a “kind of second tier integrity,” as the means for keeping the 
times we make exceptions of ourselves not get out of hand.156 If a person makes too 
many exceptions she may very well cross a threshold and damage her integrity such that 
she loses her practical identity altogether. Eventually, not only will the broker lose 
customer confidence, but more importantly, she will no longer be able to consider herself 
an honest dealer. To be sure, she could believe herself to still be honest, perhaps by 
making herself an exception to the rules. She would, however, be deceiving herself with 
that belief, because honest self-reflection would make her aware of the fact that she is a 
cheat. This is not to say that she cannot change and become a dishonest cyber-
entrepreneur. If the online broker were to change her self-conception to that of a fraud, 
she could have integrity so long as she does not revert back to her previous honest ways. 
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Rather than create problems, these complexities reveal insight into the nature and 
resilience of our practical identities.  
Just as we are forced to always have to act for a reason, so too do we always have 
obligations. We are forced to have obligations because we must have practical identities, 
which if they are to have integrity must forbid some kinds of reflective endorsement. 
Take for example a parent who says he could not let go of a stroller carrying his child 
down a hill into traffic. Of course he could, all it would take would be to let go of the 
handle. What he means is that his practical identity, as a parent, is such that he could not 
do it because he has an obligation that forbids him from doing such an action. In other 
words he could not act on any reason that would lead to a course of action that would 
involve endangering his child. This obligation could be so strong that he perhaps would 
rather die than violate their practical identity. The point is that practical identity is tied 
closely to the concept of obligation. 
Autonomy plays an important role for Korsgaard, as it is the source of obligation. 
Autonomy is the source of obligation because the reflective structure of human 
consciousness necessitates that you identify with laws or principles which govern the 
actions you choose to endorse. By itself the reflective structure of consciousness does not 
have power over us; it only shows the relation we have with ourselves by way of self-
conception. Authority is needed, along with power, to enable autonomous action. It is this 
authority that is the source of obligation. Korsgaard defines autonomy as “commanding 
yourself to do what you think it would be a good idea to do, but that in turn depends on 
who you think you are.”157 The source of obligation can be identified in the concept of 
autonomy because we are forced to act based upon reasons that are determined by our 
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sense of who we are. Autonomous beings command themselves to action based on their 
ability to make laws and act on them so long as they cohere with their sense of practical 
identity.  
Intentional actions for beings with reflective minds must take the form of a law 
because they must have a reason for action that corresponds with their practical identity. 
Furthermore, autonomy stems from one’s self-conscious mind; therefore, all 
instantiations of autonomy in cyberspace must also stem from that mind as well. This 
may seem like an obvious point but it is useful for understanding how it is that one can 
have a unified conception of self-identity in cyberspace where aspects of oneself are 
multiple and unrelated. It is in this way that the idea of a greater practical identity can be 
explored as the unifying factor in a theory of online identity. 
 
2.3.1 Korsgaard on Normative Identity and Value 
The second part of Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity examined here 
describes the way beings, such as human beings, who have self-reflective 
consciousnesses must identify with themselves as such a being if they are to self-identify 
with any other aspect of their identity. Furthermore, she argues that if such beings are to 
value anything, they must first value themselves as the source of all value. In terms of our 
cyberspace experience, before we can identify with any kind of online identity, we must 
first identify with our human identity. Likewise, if we are to value anything in cyberspace, 
perhaps a well rendered digital landscape, we must acknowledge our human identity as 
the source of all value. 
In the previous section it was shown that when forced to confront the problem of 
the normative, one has no choice but to have a practical conception of identity. Practical 
identity arises as one must choose what, for them, makes their life worth living. A life 
worth living, here, does not mean what will bring happiness or flourishing, though that 
could be chosen, but is rather a statement about how whatever reasons are adopted propel 
one through life. This is necessary because “you must take something to be normative, 
that is, some conception of practical identity must be normative for you.”158 Without a 
normative conception of one’s identity one would have no reason to act, since there 
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would be no way to act on reasons in accordance with one’s practical identity, or be 
obligated to refrain from those actions which your practical identity forbids. Human 
beings are just a kind of animal with a reflective structure of the mind, for whom a 
normative conception of identity is necessary.159 
All aspects of one’s practical identity stand in front of one’s identity as a rational 
being, which for human beings is their human identity. As animals with reflective minds 
rational beings must identify themselves as such before any contingent aspects of their 
practical identity can manifest. This is because by identifying oneself as a parent, worker, 
friend, one implicitly acknowledges the aspect of rational nature that makes such 
identifications possible. Contingent practical identities are those which a person can 
choose whether to endorse, such as “affable and funny”, “honest”, or “Internet user”. In 
day to day activities people predominantly relate to contingent practical identities, but 
they all stem from a greater conception of identity based on one’s nature as a rational 
being.160 A sense of unity in cyberspace emerges from the idea that one endorses one’s 
humanity so that contingent online identities can be identified with. How, though, does 
one proceed from a conception of one’s human identity to choosing the way in which one 
takes one’s life to be worth living? 
Value is rooted in the reflective structure of the mind as it projects onto the 
world.161 It may seem obvious, but to value anything there must be an environment in 
which value can be generated. Someone who values a possession, a sunset, a friend, or 
even an idea such as happiness, must both be capable of conceptualizing such objects and 
exist in a setting alongside them. The source of value is found in rational nature because 
without a mind capable of reflection, even in a world of things, ends could not be chosen 
as worth acting upon. A bee, for example, does not value the flower which provides 
pollen and nectar for the purpose of energy. It does not have a mind capable of creating 
such value and operates solely on instinct. A human, on the other hand, can value a 
flower in a variety of ways such as aesthetically, nutritionally, or even for metaphorical 
purposes, because the reflective mind allows one to question its authority.  This explains 
how value can be generated on the Internet. Cyberspace is an environment on to which 
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users project and find things to be valuable. In this way users in virtual worlds can value 
a location, an item, or other users. Before a person can choose such things as valuable, 
however, they must acknowledge that to value anything, one must value the conditions 
that make valuing possible.  
Value and normative practical identity both relate to the structure of the reflective 
mind but it is still unclear how this comes to be. A transcendental argument is needed to 
show that rationality is a fact about the reflective mind. In other words, rational action 
exists, therefore we know it is possible, and it is possible because simply considering the 
question shows it to be so.162 This kind of value cannot be seen from the third person 
because it is only accessible from the perspective of reflective consciousness.163 
Korsgaard notes that there should be nothing surprising in this fact because “trying to see 
the value of humanity from the third person perspective is like trying to see the colours 
someone sees by cracking open his skull.”164 It is in this way that humans find themselves 
to have value and consequently to be valuable. Consider a person who takes great pride in 
her online web log.  In valuing anything within that web site, such as the insightful posts 
and great links, she must acknowledge herself as the source of value because without her 
there would be no value, for her, in that web log. This acknowledgement need not be 
explicit and can be implicitly recognized simply by valuing anything. In other words, she 
must value her humanity as a being capable of generating value.  
Value in this sense is universal. It is universal because universalizability is 
constitutive of autonomous law making. To engage in any endorsed activity is to engage 
in certain activities which are constitutive of that action. Walking and thinking are used 
by Korsgaard as examples of this component of actions.165 If one is to walk one must put 
one foot in front of the other; it is constitutive of the action. The same goes for thinking 
in which one must adhere to certain logical rules. Just as walking and thinking have 
constitutive rules for their actions so too does willing. A constitutive element of willing is 
that it be done universally.166  
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I have shown that online identity is unified from the perspective of practical 
identity for two interrelated reasons. First, as reflective beings there is a sense in which 
we have to identify with ourselves as rational beings before any aspects of practical 
identity can be created. This identification as a rational being, or more specifically having 
a human identity, leads to a unified online conception of identity because the source of all 
identities can be isolated in the concept of one’s practical identity. Second, a conception 
of practical identity unifies a self as it is the origin for all value. Korsgaard uses her 
theory of online identity to establish justification for an ethical system. As the subject of 
online ethics becomes increasingly relevant, a theory of practical identity could be a 
starting point for understanding moral obligations in cyberspace. 
 
2.3.2 Korsgaard on Normative Claims 
Christine Korsgaard presents her theory of practical identity as an attempt to 
answer a normative question. The normative question she is concerned with is what 
justifies the claims morality makes on us. Korsgaard’s project is justificatory as it 
incorporates a first person dimension into a third person question concerning morality. 
Korsgaard’s overall project is to explain why moral agents must do, for them, what 
morality dictates.167 Such a question, on her theory, can only be answered from the first 
person perspective. Korsgaard’s position is not subjectivist, however, because in the third 
person all rational beings ought to identify themselves as moral agents and act 
accordingly.168 In other words, the phenomenological experience of morality impinges on 
agents because from the first person perspective one must act in accordance with one’s 
beliefs. One’s justification for such beliefs could be religious, ethical, or seemingly 
unknown, but what is important is that for the agent they could not act otherwise. 
Korsgaard’s moral project, like Kant’s, grounds ethics in the rational aspect of human 
nature in such a way that it is universalizable. 
Korsgaard’s ethical argument follows the Kantian tradition wherein rational 
beings must identify themselves as Citizens in the Kingdom of Ends. In the Kingdom of 
Ends, rational beings respect the rational nature of all rational beings in such a way that 
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they are always considered as ends in themselves and not simply as mere means.169 
Korsgaard’s theory comes into line with Kant’s Formula of Humanity which prescribes 
the rule for how rational beings must relate: “So act that you use humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means.”170 According to Korsgaard, to accept one’s normative identity is to 
acknowledge one’s rational nature as the root of all value and, according to Korsgaard, to 
have a moral identity.171 An agent has no choice but to act in accordance with her rational 
nature because for her something must be taken as normative. To act morally is to act as 
one who values their rational nature should, which for humans is to value their humanity. 
A person who values her rationality as the source of all value must also value it in others. 
One must acknowledge others as valuable because beings with a reflective mind can 
distance themselves from their beliefs and perceptions and put themselves in the place of 
another and conclude that they find themselves to have value and hence to be valuable. 
Furthermore, one cannot ignore another’s rationality because rational beings share a 
world of meaning in the realm of language. Korsgaard uses an example in which 
someone yells “stop!” - whether the demand is respected or not, having heard the 
command it cannot be dismissed as simply noise.172 Our rationalities impinge on each 
other. To act as a person with a moral identity should is to respect the rationality in others, 
and this is how moral obligations are established. 
The application to cyberspace is clear. Assuming Korsgaard’s establishes the 
justification for her ethical argument, we ought to respect the rational nature of other 
Internet users, regardless of whether they are anonymous, multiple, or invisible.173 Of 
                                               
169 Kant, Groundwork 4:432. 
170 Kant, Groundwork 4:428. 
171 Korsgaard, Normativity 121. 
172 Korsgaard, Normativity 140. 
173 Suler, “The Online Disinhibition Effect,” CyberPsychology and Behavior 7 (2004):  
321-326, examines some of the ways in which people are inclined to be less inhibited in an online 
environment. Individuals may be more likely to be disinhibited in an online community for various 
nonmutually exclusive reasons. The first reason has to do with disassociative anonymity, or the “you don’t 
know me” effect. Another reason has to do with the impression that one is invisible while online, or the 
“you can’t see me” effect. Next, because of the asynchronicity of the Internet people may feel they are not 
immediately responsible for their actions, otherwise known as the “see you later” effect. Solipsistic 
introjection may lead an individual to think that all his contact with others happens in his head with 
imaginative characters; this is known as the “it’s all in my head” effect. Another possibility relates to 
disassociative imagination, or the “it’s all a game” effect. Finally, authority plays less of a role in 
cyberspace because often the details of a person’s life are not known and repercussions are less likely 
  47 
course, there is a contextual element to consider as well. In play, people can explore 
darker aspects of their selves and not treat other avatars as ends in themselves. This is not 
to say, though, that one can disrespect the rational nature of the other players. Even in 
play, if it is accepted that one can take liberties regarding moral obligations between 
avatars, all things being equal, one cannot go outside of the rules and, for example, cheat 
and exploit the program code. What is important to remember about this ethical theory in 
regards to cyberspace, is that other Internet users are rational beings deserving of respect. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity provides some resources 
for exploring online identity from the first person perspective. Her theory provides a rich 
phenomenological description of what it is like to be an agent, which can be applied to 
what it feels like to be an agent in cyberspace. By following her description from the self-
conscious mind through to an understanding of how such beings come to find value, a 
unified conception of identity is established. The unity found in our autonomous human 
experience is the unity found in our online experiences. In the next chapter, this theory of 
practical identity as it relates to cyberspace is shown to have practical applications.
                                                                                                                                            
which leads to a “we’re equal” effect. All of these causes can be seen as tools or apparatuses whereby one 
can seek to mitigate accountability for their behaviour. 
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3. APPLICATIONS OF PRACTICAL IDENTITY IN CYBERSPACE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Having established a theory of online identity that can be understood as unified in 
at least one sense, it can asked what kind of work such a theory can do? In this chapter I 
show that Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity can be used to explain case studies that 
deal with online situations, as well as provide a taxonomy of online experiential states. 
The first section of this chapter straightforwardly applies the theory of practical identity 
to a famous cyber-case from the early 1990s, the case of an alleged rape in cyberspace. In 
the second section, the theory of practical identity is used to explain different ways of 
identifying with our online selves. At the end of the chapter it should be clear that not 
only can a theory of practical identity conceptually explain online identity, but is also 
useful for its practical applications.  
Online identity is a subject worthy of consideration because, as was shown in 
chapter one, multiplicity and invisibility are special characteristics of cyberspace. 
Multiplicity refers to the way in which one can manifest multiple instantiations of oneself 
in cyberspace. This feature is observable when, for example, you are roaming a virtual 
world, writing a web log post, and updating your social network profile all at the same 
time. Multiplicity becomes even more special when invisibility is considered. Invisibility 
refers to the way one’s characteristics are more arbitrary in cyberspace than they are in 
RL. This feature is observable when, for example, one chooses to project oneself in 
cyberspace as a different gender, age, or ethnicity. Individually or combined, then, 
multiplicity and invisibility lead to possibilities for self-identity that are difficult, or 
impossible, to achieve in RL.  
The popular expression ‘age is a state of mind’ may be true, as we meet youths 
wise beyond their years, and elderly persons who exhibit characteristics commonly 
associated with the young. RL physical contingencies, such as appearance and health, can 
impose restrictions regardless of one’s state of mind, however. A youth with a well 
developed political stance may be dismissed or paternalistically tolerated by her elders. 
An elderly person seeking to learn something from a group of young people may face a 
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problem as some kinds of information, perhaps definitions for slang expressions, are 
reluctantly shared. Online, though, such barriers are easily dispelled. The youth can 
participate in a political discussion without revealing her age, and the elderly person can 
visit web sites geared toward younger persons to find out what the kids these days find 
hip. Suppose, now, that the elderly person, while conducting this ethnographic project, is 
also adding information to his social networking profile which reveals his RL age. In this 
case, in at least one sense, he can be considered both old and young at the same time. 
When one considers how many identities one can create in cyberspace and the variety of 
characteristics that can be chosen for those identities, it becomes clear how multiplicity 
and invisibility are indeed special features of online identity. 
The kind of anonymity which arises from the technological barrier that separates 
users in cyberspace is important as it enables multiplicity and anonymity. Anonymity 
enables multiplicity because it provides the means to keep various personae, which can 
conflict and contradict each other, separate and distinct. Anonymity enables invisibility 
because, as the term “invisible” suggests, one’s RL characteristics cannot necessarily be 
observed, thus one is free to project whichever characteristics one chooses. This is not to 
say that anonymity is necessary for all online identities, but it is required for some kinds, 
especially the ones which press the limits of multiplicity and invisibility. 
 How, though, does a theory of practical identity explain multiplicity and 
invisibility, among other features of online identity, in any way that is more substantive 
or illuminating than other approaches? The key feature of Korsgaard’s theory of practical 
identity is its phenomenological method. By considering how we experience ourselves 
and our identities in the first person, we get insight into how we experience ourselves in 
online environments. In exploring the following case study, multiplicity and invisibility 
are highlighted because of the specialness they bring to online identity. Furthermore, 
since all online experiential states can be understood phenomenologically, they can be 
explained regardless of how close or far they happen to be from our RL self. 
 
3.2 A Rape in Cyberspace 
Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity finds depth in the phenomenological 
experience. In Chapter Two, I advanced a theory of practical identity following 
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Korsgaard to show how we can understand our online selves as at least partially unified. 
We are unified in cyberspace because all our identities can be traced to an autonomous 
being. Moreover, because autonomous beings are forced to acknowledge themselves 
implicitly as valuable we can understand the source of value.  Integrity was a key concept 
in the theory of unified online identity because it provided the means by which practical 
identities are maintained. This sense of agency, in turn, can be used to explain how we 
can have, and value, our online identities. This theory will now be demonstrated as it 
applies to a case study of an online event. 
Julian Dibbell’s “A Rape in Cyberspace; or How an Evil Clown, a Haitian 
Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society” is 
an early account of a famous event that occurred in cyberspace. 174 This event took place 
in LambdaMoo, a MUD hosted on a Xerox Corporation research computer located in 
California.175 Dibbell’s account is primarily concerned with the impact the incident had 
on the community, however, the focus here is on the first person perspective of the major 
agents involved. By examining Dibbell’s account of the LamdaMoo incident, not only are 
multiplicity and invisibility seen in the context of cyberspace, but issues such as what it 
means to have an online identity, and the permissibility of online actions are also brought 
to light.  
There were three primary agents involved in Dibbell’s description of the rape in 
cyberspace. Mr. Bungle was the antagonist of the event who used a sub-program to 
attribute actions to two other characters in the MUD. The names of the two other agents 
involved were legba and Starsinger. Mr. Bungle’s description at the time, which could 
have been seen by typing a command such as ‘look at Mr. Bungle,’ is described by 
Dibbell as “a fat, oleaginous, Bisquick-faced clown dressed in cum-stained harlequin 
garb and girdled with a mistletoe-and-hemlock belt whose buckle bore the quaint 
inscription “KISS ME UNDER THIS, BITCH!.”176 Not nearly as offensive, legba was “a 
Haitian trickster spirit of indeterminate gender, brown skinned and wearing an expensive 
pearl gray suit, top hat, and dark glasses,” and Starsinger “a rather pointedly nondescript 
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female character, tall, stout, and brown haired.”177 While there were others involved, such 
as administrators, witnesses to the event, and commentators in the post-event discussion, 
only these three personae are considered.  
All three of the LamdaMoo users constructed their online identities. By choosing 
to be a clown, a Haitian trickster spirit, and a non-descript brown haired female, they 
project into cyberspace a conception of their normative identities. This notion of 
projecting, as a means of creating identity, has implications for what it means to have an 
online self. One does not have an online identity simply by browsing a web site, perhaps 
to check the local cinema times; however, once actions are taken in which one projects 
into cyberspace, whether that is sending an e-mail, making a forum post, or sauntering 
through a virtual meadow, one has a cyber-self. 
Using a sub-program called a “voodoo doll” Mr. Bungle was able to type 
commands which made it appear that others were performing particular actions that, in 
fact, were being performed by the person representing Mr. Bungle. His first offence 
occurred while he was in the same room (room #17 of the database which was described 
as a living room) with the rest of the personae. He began by controlling legba’s avatar, 
forcing the Haitian trickster spirit to “sexually service him in a variety of more or less 
conventional ways.”178 He was ejected from the room, but discovered that the voodoo 
doll could be used from his private chamber. From afar, using this program, the evil 
clown gave the impression that legba was eating his/her own pubic hair and that 
Starsinger was violating herself with a piece of kitchen cutlery, all while Mr. Bungle 
laughed evilly.179 Eventually one of LamdaMoo’s veterans known as Zippy was able to 
halt the actions of Mr. Bungle by invoking a command which encapsulated the 
perpetrator in a “cage” from which the powers of the voodoo doll were not effective.180 
This event raises sociological issues, which seem to be Dibbell’s focus, such as what 
makes a community and how do communities form online? Ethical issues can also be 
asked about what, if any, moral implications such an event may have? While these issues 
                                               
177 Dibbell, Rape 377. 
178 Dibbell, Rape 377. 
179 Dibbell, Rape 377. 
180 Dibbell, Rape 377. 
  52 
and questions are interesting, my focus is on the phenomenological experience of the 
three main agents. 
Korsgaard’s theory self-consciousness and the problem of the normative can be 
related to the three main actors in the event. Self-consciousness for these personae’s users 
is pretty straightforward as it originates in the minds of their users. Take for example 
legba. Without a person in RL to create and control it, that Haitian trickster spirit could 
not act at all. This is to say that the avatar representation of legba on LamdaMoo, by itself, 
does not have a mind or self-consciousness. While the Internet can provide the 
opportunity to explore interesting and special aspects of oneself, in all instantiations self-
consciousness can be traced back to the person in front of the screen. This holds true even 
when one is exploring many multiple identities at once. Given the ease with which one 
can perform concurrent online actions, it can be seen that even while multiple all aspects 
of one’s online self can be found in the consciousness of a self-conscious being. Similarly, 
the importance of the self-conscious being’s relationship to cyberspace can be understood 
in terms of perceptions. It is not legba, the avatar, that sees and hears things in 
LamdaMoo, but rather the user in RL who sits in a chair before the screen reading 
descriptions about the state of affairs in that online environment.  
The reflective mind is also in the Internet users. In LamdaMoo, for example, 
sitting in her chair before logging in, Starsinger sees the name of the MUD, perhaps its 
URL,181 and there may even be some information about theme and policy. Unlike an 
animal, perhaps a house cat, looking at that same screen, the self-reflective mind can 
reflect upon its mental states. While both the cat and the human being can see the screen, 
only the human can reflect about what is on the screen. Likewise, a bot, whose function 
may be to aid new users through a process of registration, for example, is incapable of 
placing distance between its mental states – assuming that is what it has when it “reads” 
input commands – and its perceptions. The ability to turn our attention toward our 
perceptions and inclinations leads to a problem. 
The problem of the normative arises for Internet users as much as it does for any 
self-conscious being. Imagine one of LamdaMoo’s users stuck sitting in front of her 
computer continuously questioning her perceptions and desires, unable to move forward. 
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If she is going to settle on a belief, she requires a reason to do so. Likewise, if she is 
going to turn the computer on, then she also needs a reason to act on that desire. The 
problem of the normative is a problem because she has no choice but to require reasons 
for forming beliefs and acting on desires. It is important to remember that the problem of 
the normative faces the LamdaMoo user, and not the avatar. This problem leads to the 
question of how reasons are settled upon so that one’s perceptions can be believed, and 
one’s desires acted upon. Upon reflection, rational beings, must (for the most part) 
endorse actions in accordance with the practical conception of identity they create as their 
own. 
This idea of choosing your practical identity involves an element of freedom as 
self-reflective beings choose what reasons they will act on. Consider Mr. Bungle’s user 
when he decided to use the voodoo doll in the way that he did. When he used the voodoo 
doll to attribute actions to others, his act of utilizing the sub-program was not brought 
about from any external factor. He may have had a desire to act in a less than polite way, 
but the reason upon which he acted did not originate anywhere other than his self-
reflective mind. Even if he had friends sitting beside him in front of his computer 
encouraging him, the final reason for action rests solely with the person controlling Mr. 
Bungle. Conversely, when legba and Starsinger had actions attributed to them through the 
voodoo doll it is clear that their users were not endorsing a reason for an impulse. This is 
because the desire to attribute the actions to their avatars did not originate in either of 
them, but rather in the person controlling Mr. Bungle. It was that person who endorsed a 
reason to act on a desire to attribute actions to the unwilling victims. 
 Here we can see how one’s practical identity in cyberspace emerges from one’s 
reasons for action. Consider Mr. Bungle’s user as he undertook his scheme. By acting on 
his reason to use the voodoo doll, to engage a “thought polarizing” psychological 
experiment, he identified with that reason, which determines his practical identity.182 This 
is to say that by using the sub-program as he did, he was endorsing the action, thus 
becoming a kind of person who pulls juvenile, and possibly hurtful and offensive, 
experiments in virtual worlds. Unless Mr. Bungle’s user was somehow not in control of 
his actions on the other side of the screen, perhaps under duress, he cannot disavow this 
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identity because he was the person endorsing those actions. Mr. Bungle’s identity is 
created out of the reasons he takes for his actions. This is what it is for a being with a 
reflective mind to identify with their reasons for action. This is why Mr. Bungle’s user is 
mistaken that his actions have no consequence on his RL existence.183 Because his 
avatar’s actions originate in RL, he cannot disavow himself from his online actions so 
easily. Whether he acknowledges it or not, the creation of Mr. Bungle affects his RL 
practical identity. He is the kind of person who created an online identity to cause distress 
in a virtual community. 
This practical aspect of identity should be highlighted as it relates to invisibility in 
cyberspace. When choosing an online identity on a MUD, or more generally in 
cyberspace, there is a special sense in which you can choose aspects of your identity not 
available, or perhaps difficult to achieve, in RL. These special characteristics could be 
such things as life form, gender, age, ethnicity, and so on. Considering our MUD 
example, at least two of the primary agents identify themselves in ways they would not in 
RL. Mr. Bungle is a Bisquick-faced clown and legba is Haitian trickster spirit. Starsinger 
is a nondescript female which may or may not correspond to a RL identity. Regardless of 
their RL identities, however, it can be seen how their identities arise within the 
LamdaMoo environment. All of these personae are aspects of RL persons who have 
chosen to project their online selves in these ways. Their identities are grounded in the 
reasons those users endorse, but these identities also stipulate what they cannot do. They 
cannot act on what their self-identity rejects, except by engaging in rationalization or self-
deception, and that is where they get their obligations. 
In the case of Mr. Bungle, whose phenomenal obligations are realized through his 
practical identity as a Bisquick-faced clown, there was nothing preventing him from 
acting as he did. Because obligations can only originate in the computer user, the 
experience of obligation as it relates to an avatar is only a phenomenal obligation. This is 
to say, Mr. Bungle’s phenomenal obligations as a LamdaMoo citizen did not include 
treating the other users with a level of respect that was, up to that point, considered the 
norm within that community. Given the aggressive sexual nature of the language he used 
for his attack, it is hard to imagine what would count as a threat to his identity. Perhaps 
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he could not have taken it to the level of child pornography. Suppose one of LamdaMoo 
characters in room #17 during that time was a child.  It can be imagined that Mr. Bungle 
could not have brought himself to attribute the actions he did to Starsinger and legba to 
that child. In this case Mr. Bungle’s user’s practical identity would forbid him from 
raping a child in cyberspace. 
On the other hand, it is clear that the person creating Starsinger’s identity as a 
member of the LamdaMoo community could not have used the voodoo doll as Mr. 
Bungle did. Her testimony reveals as much: “Mostly, I trust people to conduct themselves 
with some veneer of civility.”184 It can be inferred from her statement that she expects to 
conduct herself with at least a veneer of civility and therefore could not be as uncivil as 
Mr. Bungle. Starsinger’s user has reasons for her actions which create a normative 
identity for her avatar and at the same time that conception of identity gives rise to 
obligations based on what would be forbidden. Again, one can only speculate about what 
Mr. Bungle’s phenomenological experiences of obligations were, but we can be fairly 
certain that Starsinger’s would include treating others with a modicum of respect. The 
point is that an “obligation always takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a loss of 
identity.”185 Reasons and obligations understood in this manner support a theory of 
unified self-identity because there is a sense in which one’s practical identity, if it is to be 
consistent, must somehow hold together.  
Integrity, as it relates to practical identity, implies living up to one’s standards, 
and explains how one’s identities are maintained through time. An avatar has character 
integrity when it lives up to the standards of its normative identity. In the case of 
Starsinger, part of her character integrity includes treating others with some degree of 
respect. It would be hard for her to consider herself civil if she began insulting others and 
taking advantage of exploits in the LamdaMoo program to humiliate others or make them 
look foolish. Mr. Bungle on the other hand, has character integrity so long as he is 
consistent with his practical identity which has no problem being uncivil in a virtual 
world. It would be hard for him to continue being a disrespectful member of the 
LamdaMoo community if he began treating people with respect.  
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The flexibility found in Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity is important 
because it helps to explain how one’s self-identity can change over time. A person’s 
cyber-identity has character integrity so long as it remains consistently true to its reasons 
for action. This can be stated more specifically as, a cyber-self has integrity so long as its 
user acts in accordance with the reasons and values she ascribes to that online identity. 
This has interesting implications for the idea of multiplicity in cyberspace. The 
fragmentation of self that one can experience in cyberspace makes it possible for various 
aspects of oneself to come into conflict and contradict each other. Because anonymity 
enables multiplicity, however, each fragment can have its own kind of integrity. Perhaps 
Mr. Bungle’s user, alongside his LambdaMoo excursions, builds web sites for charities. 
A person can be as polite as Starsinger on one MUD, and as vile as Mr. Bungle on 
another. The theory of practical identity is useful for explaining multiplicity in 
cyberspace because it can explain how contingent online practical identities can have a 
kind of integrity that preserves it through time in an online environment. 
What does it mean to be autonomous in a MUD or in cyberspace in general? It 
means commanding yourself in an online environment to do what you think it would be a 
good idea to do, depending on who you think you are. In the case of Mr. Bungle’s user he 
was autonomous when he used the voodoo doll because he was able to command himself 
to do what he thought it would be a good idea to do based on a conception of his practical 
identity. Conversely, neither legba nor Starsinger were autonomous during the ‘rape,’ 
because they could not command their actions. In other words, they were not autonomous 
because they could not act. To understand how Internet users command themselves in 
cyberspace an examination of how users form maxims for action is required. 
To act autonomously one must form a maxim for action. Mr. Bungle’s user’s 
maxim may have been something like “To humiliate others I will take over their 
characters and have them violate themselves.” If this process was to be examined in a 
Kantian ethical light the question of whether such an action could be universalized would 
have to be asked.  It seems that Mr. Bungle’s action could not be universalized while, at 
the same time, respecting the humanity of the others. But I am not concerned with this 
ethical argument. What is important is that his action can be understood as, for him, law-
giving. The action of the maxim refers to his use of the voodoo doll, and the purpose 
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refers to his reasons for undertaking the action, namely to humiliate others. Such maxims 
for online actions are not formed within the avatar, or “on the Internet,” but rather in the 
being with a reflective mind choosing to endorse reasons for action which in turn depend 
on how that person decides to express that aspect of the practical online identity. 
The idea of an online normative identity applies to an Internet user’s conception 
of their online self. In the case of LamdaMoo, for example, if one is going to participate 
in that community then one must choose some way of identifying oneself within that 
environment, even if it is simply as an invisible presence that spies upon others. While 
Starsinger’s RL self may indeed be a brown haired nondescript woman it is doubtful that 
Mr. Bungle’s is a clown dressed in Harlequin garb, and legba’s user almost certainly is 
not a Haitian trickster spirit. The Internet, however, facilitates the creation of such 
identities in such a way that users can actually put themselves in those contingent 
practical identities and act accordingly.  
The fact that cyber-identities are contingent is very important to a theory of 
unified online identity. Simply put, those who control Mr. Bungle, Starsinger, and legba, 
relate to their identities on LamdaMoo as a clown, nondescript woman, and Haitian 
trickster, respectively, must first identify as human beings whose human identities stand 
in front of any contingent MUD identities. Similarly, it is by acknowledging the value of 
one’s humanity that one can find value within cyberspace. This move from identity to 
contingent identity requires a transcendental argument because to value any particular 
identity one must value that which makes identity and value possible. To use Starsinger 
for example, before she can value anything within LamdaMoo, perhaps a friendship with 
another member, her user must first acknowledge herself as a self-reflective being 
capable of generating value. This acknowledgement need not be explicit and can be 
implicitly recognized simply by valuing anything. This implicit commitment is 
conceptual because many people never formally value their value-generating capacity. A 
theory of practical identity is useful for both its ability to explain how contingent online 
practical identities arise, and the origins of value in cyberspace. 
Online identity understood in this unified sense is applicable to any case study 
that deals with online selves. To apply it, all one needs to do is identify the personae 
involved, trace those personae to their users, discover what reasons those users endorse 
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on behalf of their online selves, and then observe whether they are consistent in their 
attribution of action to those cyber-selves such that it lives up to the standards they have 
set out for it. If they are consistent in this way then their online selves have character 
integrity, and if they are not consistent in this way then they do not have character 
integrity, or at the least it is compromised. By explaining how an online self can have 
character integrity, even in this contained sense, a kind of unity is established in 
cyberspace. 
 
3.3 A Users’ Guide to Self-Awareness in Cyberspace 
How are we to understand the various ways in which we can experience online 
identity? As has already been shown, online identity allows one to experiment with 
various aspects of oneself in ways not easily achieved in RL. In this section I provide an 
outline for understanding our online selves in any phenomenological state.  
Using the tools found in Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity, a taxonomy of 
online experiential states can be explained using one’s RL self as a baseline. Since online 
identity requires one have a RL identity, the latter is a solid standard to which online 
identities can be compared. This model for self-awareness in cyberspace is presented as a 
spectrum that ranges from online identities that are very much like one’s RL identity, to 
online identities radically different from one’s RL identity. Such online understandings, 
then, are contingent on an understanding of who you are in a broader sense. 
These ways of self-identifying in cyberspace can be explained with the tools 
found in the theory of practical identity by focusing on the phenomenological experience 
of endorsing reasons for action in accordance with a normative conception of identity. 
Normative identity, as discussed in section 2.3.1, refers to the reasons one chooses for 
actions that propel one through life in accordance to what one deems a life worth living. 
One’s RL self can be compared to one’s online selves by examining the reasons for 
action, along with the entailing values, of their various online practical identities. To be 
sure, all reasons for action along with the corresponding values stem from one’s greater 
self, but since one can have experiences in cyberspace that would be impossible or 
difficult to achieve in RL, there is a sense in which RL identity and online identity can be 
compared.  
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 Invisibility in cyberspace is the special feature addressed in this section. 
Invisibility is the term used to refer to the way one’s online characteristics are more 
arbitrary in cyberspace than they are in RL. With a theory of practical identity, however, 
invisibility can be explained beyond simply choosing characteristics: the theory can 
explain how we identify, in a deep way, with those characteristics. Consider, for example, 
the difference between an MMO player who chooses an avatar of the opposite sex for 
strategic reasons and a virtual world inhabitant who chooses an avatar of the opposite sex 
to explore a different gender.186 In the first case, the MMO player chooses characteristics 
different from her RL characteristics, and identifies with those characteristics. Suppose 
her reason for choosing that avatar stems from a desire, as a game player, to gain an in-
game advantage. The reason promotes the values of the RL player insofar as the end to 
the means is gaming success. To be sure, game player is not the only way she can 
identify with this online identity since she could also be identifying with it as, among 
others things, a manipulator. In this case, assuming she has no qualms about being 
manipulative in RL games either, there is not much difference between the player’s RL 
self and online self because their reasons and values are in sync.  
In the second case, the person controlling the virtual world inhabitant also 
chooses characteristics different from his RL characteristics and identifies with those 
characteristics. Supposing his reason for choosing that avatar stems from a desire, as a 
member of a particular gender, to have an experience not easily achieved in RL. The 
means to this end may require that the virtual world inhabitant identify with reasons and 
values quite different than his RL self. The difference between these two cases, then, is 
found in the relation one’s online self has to one’s RL self. The project of this section is 
to explain how two people can seemingly choose the same kinds of characteristics, e.g. 
an opposite gender, but identify with them in very different ways. By tracing the online 
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identities back to their users we can see how even though they are both projecting into 
online environments, the decisions are being made in RL by RL selves. By comparing the 
online identities to their RL selves, it can be shown how the MMO player is not much 
different than her RL self, whereas the user in the virtual world is quite different than his 
RL self.  
Onymity, pseudonymity, and anonymity are the terms I use, in an internal sense, 
to explain the ways in which one can understand one’s online selves. This sense is 
internal because it refers to an awareness of one’s online identity in relation to one’s RL 
self. In this internal sense we are onymous when we identify with our online identity 
much like we do our RL self, we are pseudonymous when there are slight differences 
between our online self and RL self, and we are anonymous when there is a radical 
separation between our RL self and online self. This terminology is a little precarious, 
however, since these terms already find use as descriptors of external relations between 
people.187 In the external sense we are onymous when we are known to each other, we are 
pseudonymous when we are known to each other by different not uniquely re-identifiable 
names, and we are anonymous when we are not known to each other. It could be asked, 
then, if these terms already function in this external sense, why would I confuse the 
matter by attributing them an internal sense? There are two reasons that warrant the 
distinction. First, a conflation already exists within the concept of anonymity as it applies 
to the Internet. Second, there are parallels that can be drawn between the two senses. For 
example, when someone is anonymous his presence is undetectable, and when one is 
internally anonymous in cyberspace one’s online self is, in a way, unaware of one’s RL 
self. The similarities are not exact, but the external senses of these terms can be used to 
point toward what is meant by the internal senses.  
A conflation can occur when the concept of anonymity is considered in the 
context of cyberspace. This conflation can be clarified by making a distinction between 
external anonymity and internal anonymity. This distinction is represented in a famous 
1993 The New Yorker magazine comic, depicting a dog sitting in a chair, in front of a 
computer, talking to another dog sitting on the floor. The caption reads, “On the Internet, 
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nobody knows you’re a dog.”188 The conflation, and the comic’s humour, is found in the 
double meaning of the word ‘dog.’ If dogs could talk and use computers, they could hide 
behind the anonymity provided by the technological layer that the Internet enables. This 
sense of anonymity is external because it refers to a kind of relation that can exist 
between people online – “nobody knows you’re a dog.” In a way, external anonymity is a 
default position (or at least the feeling of anonymity) for online relations because until 
you make yourself known to others, the technological layer of the Internet keeps your 
identity hidden. 
In the internal sense, anonymity refers to the way in which people can identify 
with aspects of their online self that are radically different than their RL self. Internal 
anonymity is captured in The New Yorker comic because the term ‘dog’ can be used 
idiomatically to refer to less than virtuous behaviour. In this way, for example, someone 
could be a morally upstanding person in RL, but unbeknownst to anyone else, completely 
loutish and deceptive in cyberspace – “you are a dog.” The analogy is not exact because 
internal anonymity is not the only way of explaining this experiential state. As will be 
shown in the following three sections, there are grey areas on this spectrum of self-
awareness in cyberspace. One such grey area is found between the point from which one 
uses the Internet to rationalize behaviour that would not be endorsed by one’s RL self, 
and the point where one begins to lose sight of one’s RL self altogether. 
The conflation between the two senses of anonymity as it relates to cyberspace 
can also be found in popular expressions such as, “You can be whoever you want on the 
Internet.” You cannot be whoever you want in an external sense, your favorite performer 
for example, because you are not that person. You could, however, create an online 
identity based on your favorite performer and project into cyberspace as that person. In 
this case, the distance between your RL self and your online self, which requires a self-
awareness of each, determines where you place on the spectrum of online experiential 
states. If you are projecting as your favorite performer as a joke to see if you can fool a 
friend, then you are much closer to your RL self than if you embrace the role whole 
heartedly in an attempt to be that other person. 
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3.3.1 Onymity in Cyberspace 
This first section in the guide to self-awareness in cyberspace shows that there are 
times when our online identities are very much like our RL identity. Internal onymity is 
the term used to refer to this kind of online self-awareness. Onymity means to have a 
name or be named and has both an internal and external sense. The external sense of 
onymity can be used to point towards how we can understand onymity in its internal 
sense.  
External onymity refers to the relation between people that are known to each 
other.  In many of our day to day interactions with those we know external onymity is the 
default relation, because, once known, those people are re-identifiable. When we wake 
we often see those we live with, we work alongside colleagues and co-workers, and in the 
evenings spend time with friends and acquaintances. In cyberspace we are externally 
onymous in much the same way. We e-mail friends, have virtual conferences with 
colleagues and stay connected though personal web logs and social networks.  
Internal onymity refers to an awareness of one’s online self as not different, in 
terms of reasons for action and values, than one’s RL self. In other words, when a person 
relates to her online self in an internally onymous manner, it means that he makes no 
distinction between his RL self and his online self. The distinction is there by virtue of 
their projecting into cyberspace; however, it is not considered important or relevant, if 
even considered at all. The important thing to remember about the experiential state of 
online internal onymity is that nothing changes with respect to self-identification and 
values when the user accesses the Internet. For example, when one checks one’s e-mail 
and sends a note to a colleague about work, one is internally onymous so long as the 
message does not contain anything they would not be willing to say in person, or even if 
not, so long as the senders address is not forged. 
In some cases people can not help but relate to their online self in this way. This 
could be because they have an obligation to uphold certain principles or ideas. In political 
web forums most people who post comments probably are doing so in an internal 
onymous sense. This is because their beliefs are so strongly held that to project any other 
kind of opinion may be unthinkable. A person who believes strongly in Marxist political 
theory would most likely have a hard time sincerely arguing a neo-liberal position in a 
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web forum. Their normative identity as a Marxist obligates them not to promote an 
opposing ideology even if it is in cyberspace. Even “concern trolls” (those who 
masquerade as sympathizers of a view but express concern about some issue or idea in 
hopes of having such concerns catch on) are identifying with their RL self in relation to 
those held beliefs.189 It is hard to imagine how one could hold strongly onto a belief in 
RL and then sincerely eschew it in favour of its opposite position in cyberspace. This is 
because, as was shown in Chapter 2, some obligations are so strong that people may 
rather die than violate them. One’s onymous practical online identity can arise in almost 
any online media -- what is important is that one’s normative identities and values are 
shared between cyberspace and RL. 
Another feature of this onymous relation to one’s online self is that a person can 
keep her values separated in cyberspace. In one web forum a person can be an apolitical 
connoisseur of nineteen eighties horror movies and in another a rabidly partisan political 
pundit. The two identities need not overlap so a person can enjoy a certain freedom from 
views on one subject without polluting or affecting the views of another.  
People relate to their online selves in this way because they want simply to be 
themselves. This is possibly the simplest way in which one can relate to one’s online self 
because it does not require any change in attitude. Internal onymity is probably the most 
common way in which people identity with their online selves.  
The external sense of onymity can point towards the internal sense of onymity in 
the way it indicates a knowing of selves. The external sense of onymity, where we are 
known to each other, is similar to the internal sense of onymity, where our online self and 
RL self are known to each other because they are basically one and the same. To bring it 
back to the user’s guide, you will find that your experiential online state is internally 
onymous when you endorse reasons for actions in line with a conception of who you are 
and what you consider to be a life worth living in RL. 
 
3.3.2 Pseudonymity in Cyberspace  
This second section in the guide to self-awareness in cyberspace shows that there 
are times when our online identities begin to deviate away from our RL normative 
                                               
189 On the Internet, the term “troll” is used to generally refer to those who deliberately provoke 
others with no good reason other than, perhaps, self amusement.  
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conception of identity. Internal pseudonymity is the term used to refer to this kind of 
online awareness. Pseudonymity means “to bear a false name” and has both an internal 
and external sense. The external sense of pseudonymity can be used to point towards how 
we can understand the internal sense as it relates to online identity. 
External pseudonymity refers to a relation between people where someone uses a 
different name than the one by which they are generally known. An author, for example, 
writes pseudonymously when a work is published under a name different than that 
associated with his own previously published works or his RL identity. In cyberspace, 
external pseudonymity is common as people often use pseudonyms for reasons such as 
privacy or security.  
Internal pseudonymity refers to an awareness of one’s online self as slightly 
different, in terms of reasons for action and values, than one’s RL self. This deviation can 
continue to the point where one would be hard pressed to see similarities between the RL 
self and the online self. Pseudonymous aspects of one’s practical identity can be explored 
on the spectrum between onymity and anonymity. This broad category can be further 
demarcated by noticing that some pseudonymous online selves are closer to internal 
onymity, whereas others closer to internal anonymity. Someone who projects an idealized 
version of themselves on a social networking web site is more alike to their RL self than 
someone who uses cyberspace as a means to rationalize behaviour they would not in RL. 
It is in this way that three over-arching groups can be classified. Group A identifies 
aspects of one’s online self that, while pseudonymous, are closer to internal onymity. 
Group B examines practical identities in the middle area which are not closer to either 
end of the spectrum. Group C isolates practical identities that are closer to the notion of 
an anonymous online self.  
Internally pseudonymity is found in Group A as one departs from an onymous 
conception of one’s online identity toward a pseudonymous conception. Light can be 
shed on this problem, however, by examining some kinds of examples in which a 
person’s conception of their online self seems to make this transition. The beginnings of 
pseudonymous practical identity in cyberspace can be traced to the point at which people 
start endorsing actions that they would not or do not in RL. 
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Consider a person who sincerely enjoys Dickens novels and golf but, on her social 
networking profile only claims to like the novels because golf can have negative 
connotations regarding her status within her online social network, and she does not want 
to appear haughty or discriminatory. This person is beginning to move toward a 
pseudonymous conception of her online self, because in her attempt to project an 
idealized aspect of herself, she is hiding an aspect of her RL self. In other words, her 
normative conception of her online self differs from her normative conception of her RL 
self. While it is not a big change, what should be clear is that the line between onymously 
and pseudonymously relating to one’s practical identity is not sharp and can be 
understood more as a gradual departure.  
Another kind of example that shows how people can depart slightly from their RL 
selves in cyberspace is found in situations where people say their online self is just like 
them except for differences that do not change their conception of who they are or the 
values they hold. Consider a person who in RL has a disability which confines him to a 
wheelchair, but in a virtual world he creates an online self that is like him in every way 
except for the disability. This person looks, speaks, and smells just as he does in RL, but 
rather than wheel around for transportation in the virtual world he is able to walk and run. 
There is not much difference between his online self and RL self; however, since he can 
endorse actions in cyberspace that he cannot in RL, in a minimal sense he is beginning to 
self-identify in an internally pseudonymous manner. 
Internally pseudonymous online identity is found in Group B as a person begins 
to endorse actions in tension with what would be endorsed in RL. This is a hazy area, 
because it is hard to know when you have passed the threshold that keeps you closer to an 
onymous online self, or moves you toward an internally anonymous understanding of 
your online identity. There are many kinds of examples that could exemplify this kind of 
online identity, two of which are examined here. The first class of example concerns 
instances in which people use the Internet as means to make themselves exceptions. The 
second class of examples examines a situation where embarrassment forces a person to 
pursue an interest anonymously in cyberspace. 
When people use the Internet as a tool for making themselves exceptions they are 
identifying reasons for a normative conception of their cyber-self that would not endorse 
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in RL. Consider, a monogamously married man who has an emotionally charged online 
relationship with someone other than his partner. This man may think that since there is 
no physical contact he can go ahead and participate in an online affair. Assuming the man 
would not engage in such an affair in RL, perhaps with an “office hubby,” he is using the 
Internet as a means of separating the actions he would endorse online from those they 
would not in ordinary day to day life. 
The second example deals with situations where someone might join an online 
community and endorse actions within that environment that would be embarrassing or 
unacceptable in RL. Consider a woman who would feel ashamed if it were known by her 
friends and family that she enjoyed celebrity news. On the internet, however, she follows 
such news with keen interest. This person may even make a web site that aggregates 
stories from various sources, or participate in a community of people who track movie 
star sightings and reveal the latest gossip about celebrity events. A middle of the road 
conception of internal pseudonymous online identity is found in this example as the 
woman identifies with her online self differently that she self-identifies with her RL self. 
Group C isolates a kind of internal pseudonymity that approaches the concept of 
internal anonymity. Again, because these identities are being examined on a spectrum it 
is hard to know when thresholds are crossed. It seems that for this group to only approach 
this end of the spectrum, characteristics very different from one’s RL characteristics are 
chosen and identified with, but without losing a grasp on one’s RL self. 
What if, in the example of man with a disability, rather than simply choosing to 
project as an able bodied person, he chooses additional characteristics that differ from his 
RL self? Suppose he also changes his gender, age, ethnicity, and attitude toward life. 
Now, in the virtual world he looks and acts considerably differently than he does in RL. 
When he interacts with others it is from a perspective, and for reasons, much different 
than those to which he is accustomed. So long as he remembers that his RL self exists in 
RL, and that self-consciousness originates in RL, he can be considered internally 
pseudonymous in cyberspace on this far edge of the spectrum. 
The external sense of pseudonymity can point towards the internal sense of 
pseudonymity in the way it indicates a difference between one’s RL self and one’s online 
self. Where the external sense of pseudonymity refers to a difference in names by which 
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people are known to each other, the internal sense refers to a difference in the way one’s 
RL self is known to its online selves. When the man rationalizes his online affair, in a 
way his online self is known to him in a different way than he knows his RL self. His 
online self is the one who has emotionally charged online affairs, whereas his RL self 
would never condone such action. To bring it back to the user’s guide, you will find that 
your experiential online state is internally pseudonymous when you endorse reasons for 
actions that you would not endorse in RL, but have not gone so far as to lose sight of the 
difference between your online selves and RL self. 
3.3.3 Anonymity in Cyberspace 
The final section in the guide to self-awareness in cyberspace shows that there are 
situations where one can lose oneself in a cyber identity to the point where awareness of 
one’s RL self is a fleeting thought. Internal anonymity is the terms used to refer to this 
kind of online self-awareness (or lack of awareness). Anonymity means to be without a 
name or nameless and can have both an external and internal sense. The external sense of 
anonymity can be used to point us towards the internal sense of anonymity as it relates to 
online selves. 
External anonymity, as already mentioned, is “a form of inaccessibility to others 
to whom one is related or with whom one shares a social environment, even if only or 
primarily in virtue of the effects of one’s actions.”190 There are all kinds of ways someone 
can be anonymous in RL. Unintentional anonymity obtains when, for example, you 
attend public events such as sporting events. Intentional anonymity can obtain when you 
disguise yourself to spy on someone. In cyberspace, where it has be shown that 
anonymity is a kind of default position, we are anonymous when commenting on web 
logs that do not require any kind of identification. People can go to great lengths to be 
anonymous in cyberspace employing software to cover their online tracks. External 
anonymity is especially interesting because it is the feature of the Internet that enables 
multiplicity and invisibility.  
Internal anonymity refers to an awareness of one’s online self far removed from 
one’s RL self. Method acting is a good analogy for this kind of awareness. When a 
method actor is fully engaged in her role, her awareness of a RL self is distant and 
                                               
190 Wallace, Anonymity 25. 
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possibly not even considered. In some cases such awareness of one’s internally 
anonymous self may not arrive until after the identity has been disengaged. When one is 
internally anonymous they take measures to shield one’s online identity, motivations, and 
values from the mind of the self-conscious being in the chair. This kind of anonymous 
online identity is most often seen in role playing games and virtual worlds where users 
can try to keep the beliefs and desires of the RL self separate than the beliefs and desires 
of the online personae.  
To be sure, one can never truly sever the link between one’s online self and one’s 
RL self. The limits, however, can be pushed. One draws near an anonymous online self 
by beginning with the premise that the self-consciousness of their online persona is 
contained solely within the online environment. This can be done by putting yourself in 
the position of the personae, and consider it as the identity that stands behind all others 
and is the source of all value. In this way, from the perspective of the personae, the 
problem of the normative is faced and value generated.  
Take, for example, a person who wants to explore the darker side of human nature 
but is not an evil person in RL. This user could create an online persona receptive to evil 
ideas in a MUD. In this way he can identify themselves as callous and devious, and value 
ill gotten gains without guilt since from the first person perspective of that persona, that is 
what it is to be evil. Clearly, however, this shielding can only go so far as there may be 
certain acts which would be fine for the persona, but could not be endorsed by the user - 
even if it is all online.  
The extreme nature of anonymously self-identifying with one’s online self makes 
it a very uncommon experience, and is probably not something experienced by the 
average Internet user. It is interesting to see, however, how the Internet can allow persons 
to put such distance between their RL selves and their cyber-selves.  
The external sense of anonymity can point towards the internal sense of 
anonymity in the way that something is unknown. In the external sense, an anonymous 
person is unknown to others, and in the internal sense one’s RL is, in a sense, unknown to 
one’s online self. To bring it back to the user’s guide, your experiential online state is 
anonymous when you endorse reasons for actions on behalf of a created persona unaware 
of a RL self. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity, when 
applied to cyberspace, can have practical applications. This theory was used to show it 
can be applied to case studies of events which occur on the Internet, as well as provide a 
deep understanding of how we can relate to our online selves.  The Internet provides 
many opportunities to experiment and play with aspects of their self. Some of these 
aspects were seen in the example of a rape in cyberspace as multiplicity and invisibility 
were demonstrated in the event that transpired. The users who controlled Mr. Bungle, 
legba, and Starsinger could have their experience explained phenomenologically, as their 
actions, while online, could always be traced back to someone using a computer to access 
LamdaMoo. The phenomenological approach to practical identity also provides the 
means for sketching a taxonomy on online experiential states. By using one’s RL 
conception of a normative identity as a baseline, it was shown how one’s online identities 
can range from very similar to one’s RL self, to very different from one’s RL self. Using 
this taxonomy, anyone should be able to be aware of the state of their online self so long 
as they have a solid awareness of their RL self.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  70 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Internet’s affect on the world has been remarkable. In a short period of time, 
the Internet has managed to creep its way in to many aspects of our everyday lives. Never 
has correspondence across vast distances been easier, or knowledge more widely 
disseminated. We do business online, visit friends, play games, find partners, find 
entertainment, make entertainment, receive our news, and much more. There are no 
indications that the incredible growth rate of the Internet is going to slow down either. As 
the world becomes ever more connected through this technology, new questions and 
problems will arise. In this thesis I addressed two such questions. First, what affect, if any, 
does the Internet have on our identities? Second, how does the Internet affect our 
capacity for autonomy and integrity? 
The subject of online identity is as interesting as it is relevant. Sherry Turkle 
broaches this subject from a decentered perspective. Turkle raises many strong points 
about the ways in which the Internet affects our identities, the value of the Internet for 
exploring aspects of the self, especially in light of anonymity, multiplicity, and 
invisibility in cyberspace. It was shown, however, that her theory falls short because it 
draws a false conclusion and is unable to examine identity in a deep sense. 
Korsgaard’s theory of practical identity was then explored for its ability to explain 
identity in a deep sense, while still accounting for the special features of cyberspace. This 
theory was useful for explaining online identity because, as it is grounded in human 
nature, it is able to describe how it is that our minds are capable creating identities, and 
the process such a creation undertakes. With a theory of practical identity it was shown 
how online selves can have, in a limited sense, their own kind of integrity, along with an 
explanation of how value can be generated in cyberspace. 
In the final chapter this theory of practical identity was used in a practical way. It 
was shown that a theory of practical identity can be used to explain online events, as well 
as explain online experiential states. It is hoped that as the Internet become increasingly 
ubiquitous, and developers create exciting new media to explore, and the number of users 
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continues to grow, that a theory of unified online identity can provide insight into how we 
understand ourselves in cyberspace. 
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